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ABSTRACT 
The institution mechanisms for the organisational and coordination aspects in a 
collective action (CA) on irrigation systems of Tanzania have not been given 
sufficient attention. Consequently, smallholder rice irrigation systems, which are 
either traditional improved or modern schemes, perform poorly in operations and 
maintenance of infrastructures, water management, respect of bylaws and 
regulations. Contrary to the collective incentives previously studied in managing the 
irrigation systems, the novelty of this study is the focus of analysis on the transaction 
costs (TC) of collective action and the factors, which influence the institutional 
quality based on individual resource user incentives. The study combined cross 
sectional and panel data designs to address the different objectives. Using different 
econometric analyses techniques (Heckman sample selection, Mixed effect linear 
model, SFA and 2SLS) in each objective, four major findings emerged: Self-
selection effect has greater impact on CA survival; the TC related to contact, and 
control influence the institutional quality; CA affect the technical efficiency and 
allocation of factors of production; and farm household objectives was an important 
incentive for CA coordination. The study concludes that self-selection effect factors 
are important criteria for CA member recruitment, and that the institutional quality is 
improved by managing TCs. CA leads into technical inefficiency and over use of 
factors of production. Farm household objectives influence coordination efficiency. 
The study recommends consideration of self-selection effect factors, and TCs-contact 
and control increase, along with TCs attributes asset specificities: site specificity like 
soil fertility, water, market access, and human capital assets development on 
technologies application and agri business oriented production for successful CA. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Background Information 
Governments in developing countries worldwide have transferred, in a varying 
degrees, the rights and management responsibilities for natural resources such as 
forestry, rangelands, protected areas, and water particularly, irrigation systems and 
water sheds to the communities (Meinzen-Dick, 2004; Araral, 2008; Behera, 2009). 
This policy shift is a response towards among other factors, greater awareness of the 
governments in regard to incentive problems amongst these resources management. 
As such the expectation has been that ‘‘since these resources are usually important to 
the livelihood of the users themselves, they will in that case manage such resources 
more efficiently, equitably, and sustainably than government bureaucrats per see’’. 
 
In Tanzania, common property rights in the form of common water right permit that 
is granted collectively to the groups of water users in a collective action setting has 
been the policy instrument implemented to ensure management of irrigation systems 
(NIPO, 2009). The common water rights permit is an institution with clearly defined 
property rights and legal aspects considered to allow contracts to be enforced for 
water resource utilization by water users, based on collective management of the 
group of water users.  It requires that water users organize themselves into groups 
before they are granted the common water right permit to access water. In 
consequence, organized user-groups in a collective action setting are considered as a 
strategy that translates into efficient performance of irrigation systems. The irrigation 
systems are either traditional improved schemes, defined as ones, which were 
 2 
initiated by farmers and later on improved by the government/external agents, or 
modern schemes that are characterized by high level of mechanization, constructed 
by external agents (NIPO, 2009; Matekere and Lema, 2012).  
 
Understanding the determinants of performance has been a central concern because 
most irrigation systems perform poorly contrary to the envisaged expectations, as a 
result low level of irrigation farming practice is evident (Water sector, 2009; You et 
al. 2010). This low level of farming practice is characterized by two main features: 
frequent entry and exit of farmers; and smaller cultivated land area compared with 
their holdings (Msuya and Isinika, 2011; MAFC, 2011). It has been argued that a 
number of factors have contributed to the problem, like poor operation and 
maintenance of infrastructure, poor water management and control, inefficient 
extension services (NIPO, 2009; SUA, 2010), and farmers’ disregard of by-laws 
(Rajabu and Mahoo, 2008). Practically, these underlying contributing factors are 
manifestation of a lack of collective action amongst farmers. Theories of common 
natural resources management suggest that “failure to abide by mutual obligations is 
a deterrent to collective action efforts’’ (Wade, 1987; Ostrom, 2002, 2010). 
 
Collective action (CA) has been defined in several ways, but the definition common 
to all authors is “the tendency for a group of people with shared interest to act 
together in pursuit of those interests’’ (Oliver, 2004; Araral, 2008; Becker, 2012). 
The concept of CA is closely linked to property rights, implying the presence of an 
“authority that undertakes a particular action to enforce in a specific domain, e.g. the 
right of access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation’’. In other words, 
it is a function of legal rules, organisational form, enforcement, norm and behaviour. 
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In this regards, the benefits and process of CA institution management entail some 
costs arising from the transaction or actions undertaken between individuals 
involved.  According to Commons, (1934) cited in Groenewegen et al. (2010) 
transaction comprises a legal transfer of ownership, which, include exchange of 
rights and duties – it correlates law, economics and ethics. As such, CA involves 
varying degrees of transaction costs (TCs) in order for the farmer organisations to 
function and realize benefits from efficient coordination of resource utilization 
(Marshall, 2013).  
 
The coordination of economic activities creates costs due to imperfection and 
uncertainty in the economic system. According to Groenewegen et al. (2010), TCs 
have been grouped into three categories of costs (i) contact costs, which are related 
to search and information cost aspects. For example, one may incur expenses like 
phone expenses or travel costs in the process of striking deals, (ii) contract costs, 
which comprise of negotiation issues and concluding contracts such as service costs 
of an agent, and (iii) control cost, which entails monitoring and enforcement costs to 
ensure compliances of the agreements among parties.   
 
At the same time, TCs can take several forms, and normally vary from system to 
system. For example, in the irrigation systems, farmers can mobilize labour and or 
money for operation and maintenance of irrigation infrastructures, agree on the 
mechanisms of water allocation, distribution of benefits, control and enforcement of 
rules and regulations set there in, as well as make use of the farmer group(s) as a 
capital or social network to mobilize and contact various support services like 
research, extension, marketing arrangements and credit services among others to 
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enhance their irrigation resource utilization for their livelihood improvement. 
Clearly, all these functions are integral part of the CA organisational and 
coordination aspects, which are the transaction costs elements that can vary in the 
magnitude depending on the mode of governance, leadership, and how members 
value the collective action institution (Williamson, 2007; Groenewegen et al, 2010). 
Therefore, understanding better the working of CA is important to make irrigation 
systems, farmer organisations and cooperation, and agri- business chains 
management and policies in Tanzania more effective.  
 
Little or none is debated in the literature on the actual working of CA and its 
mechanism of organizational efficiency in the irrigation systems. Several authors, 
Agrawal, (2000), Meinzen-Dick, (2000), and Ostrom, (2002,2010), have identified 
factors such as group size, physical characteristics of the common resource, and 
characteristics of resource users in influencing collective action successfulness in the 
commons.  Others, Komakech et al. (2012) studied how local institutions emerge to 
facilitate CA in a small water catchment area in Tanzania; they argued that a 
combination of inequalities and interdependence of resource users explain sustained 
CA. Altogether, these studies provided insights on factors, which facilitate CA, but 
they did not explicitly tell how such factors affect the CA.  
 
For example, how member farmers self-select into groups or farming types, and 
where do these difference come from (Lanteri, 2008), how TCs and physical 
variations due to uncertainty of the resource use or inequalities and interdependence 
of members and resource users preferences affect CA organisational coordination 
efficiency, strategic management on the institutional quality, and how TCs embedded 
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in CA affect technical efficiency and production factors allocation in the irrigation 
systems performance. 
 
The aim of this study was to fill such gaps by analyzing in detail the transaction costs 
of collective action and the factors behind the institutional quality influence on the 
rice irrigation systems performance in the Lake Victoria basin of Tanzania. In 
particular, evaluate the attitudinal behaviour among farmers and the nature of CA 
survival: self selection effects, commitments there in and transaction costs involved 
and institution quality status, building on the work of Komakech et al. (2012), and 
the various studies e.g. Wade, (1987), Ostrom, (2002, 2010), Araral, (2012) and 
Lanteri (2008).  
 
Criteria generated from household decisions are important indicators (factors) for 
performance evaluations. Indicators that farmers themselves have consensus are easy 
to monitor and evaluate, this will help the irrigation schemes performance and 
policies in Tanzania to be more effective. 
 
1.2  Problem Statement  
Despite endowment for water resources and government policy efforts directed 
towards investment on irrigation development (Walter, 2008; MAFSC, 2013), 
smallholder irrigation schemes still perform poorly in Tanzania. In fact, the poor 
performance is observed in low level of irrigation practices (You et al. 2010). Yet, 
most of the interventions have been from top down mainly focusing on development 
of infrastructure rather than on the participants and extension services. Though, 
common property rights granted collectively to the groups of water resource users in 
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a collective action setting has been the policy instrument implemented to 
accommodate participants to ensure efficient performance of irrigation schemes 
management (NIPO, 2009), hitherto, low level of irrigation farming practices is 
evident (Water sector, 2009; You et al. 2010). The area under irrigation has remained 
low about 6.3% of the total high to medium irrigation potential of 29.4 million 
hectares, and the households that use irrigation are less than 5% (NAPO, 2013), 
while farmers’ participation in irrigation development plans on a public- private 
partnership basis as key actors has also been absent (Meinzen-Dick, 2015).  
 
As a consequence, the irrigation systems’ inefficient outcomes pointed out such as 
frequent entry and exit due to deficient in management that keeps available water 
from reaching entire participants’ land area in the scheme (Svendsen et al. 2008), and 
smaller cultivated land areas compared with their holdings in various irrigation 
schemes, characterise the poor performance (NIPO, 2009; SUA, 2010; Msuya and 
Isinika, 2011; MAFC, 2011).   
 
A number of factors have been identified out to contribute to the problem of 
inefficient outcomes outlined above. They include factors like poor operation and 
maintenance (O&M) of irrigation infrastructure, poor water management and control 
(WMC) (NIPO, 2009; SUA, 2010, Evans et al. 2012), and farmers’ disregard of by-
laws, aggravated by inefficient extension advisory services (Rajabu and Mahoo, 
2008). Practically, these underlying contributing factors, especially poor O&M, poor 
WMC, and farmers’ disregard of by-laws are attributed to a lack of collective action 
(CA) amongst farmers.  
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Collective action is an instrument that is expected to ensure irrigation system-a 
common pool resource functional (Ostrom, 2010). Nevertheless, the successfulness 
is associated with the reduction or proper alignment of transaction costs or barriers 
and constraints embedded in it. Several authors, Agrawal, (2000), Meinze-Dick, 
(2000), and Ostrom, (2000, 2010), have identified factors such as group size, 
physical characteristics of the common resource, and characteristics of resource users 
as influencing collective action successfulness. Other scholars have argued both 
theoretically and empirically that the openness and stability of the community is a 
crucial determinant of community resource management, because the higher the rate 
of migration, mobility, and market integration, the lower the likelihood of voluntary 
cooperation, or organisation (Ostrom, 2002). These studies are useful in explaining 
collective action conditions for successfulness, but did not explicitly tell the extent of 
their effects, and ignored transaction costs, which are important characteristics of the 
collective action. Transaction costs are the costs of contact, contract and control 
arising due to environmental uncertainty and human behaviour uncertainty such as 
risks for the contractual party’s opportunistic behaviour, misappropriation of rents 
from transaction specific investment (Groenewegen et al 2010). This thesis focused 
on the transaction costs in the context of individual resource users’ incentives to 
understand better how CA works, and how such insights can assist in aligning 
incentives in farmer organisation and cooperations. 
 
1.3  Justification of the Study 
Understanding better the mechanisms and organizational dynamics for the working 
of CA is important to make irrigation systems performance and related policies in 
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Tanzania more effective. Particularly, scholars have explained CA differences on 
natural resources management across the world by groups or sociability 
identification, environmental (ecology) and technology congruency, and economic 
factors on their own right (Wade, 1987; Ostrom, 2002). While in Sub Saharan Africa 
(SSA), existing studies on CA have focused on the implications of local institutions 
involving water, forestry and grazing land (Cleaver, 2001; Quinn et al. 2007; Deneke 
et al. 2011; German et al. 2012).  
 
In Tanzania, few studies on CA e.g. Komakech et al. (2012) have been conducted - 
involving farmers from one village using case study that employed qualitative 
approach to assess how local institutions emerge to facilitate CA in a small water 
catchment area. They argued that a combination of inequalities and interdependence 
of resource users explain sustained CA.  The reviewed studies are very useful in 
providing insights on how local institutions work.  
 
However, most of previous work and case studies reviewed do not explicitly tell the 
relations between transaction costs of collective action and institutional quality in 
regard to household decision and irrigation performance. In particular, several 
authors studying CA have assumed zero transaction costs and exogenous variables, 
which is not realistic. They have also ignored some relevant non tangible values like 
social networks and helpfulness, and unobserved differences resulting from 
preferences among households such as livelihood strategies/adjustments like choice 
of farming systems, abilities and attitudes, inputs used, as well as engagement in off 
farm (or entrepreneurship) activities. These aspects can condition farmers’ decisions 
to foster or deter CA successfulness (Dercon et al. 2012; Araral, 2012). Thus, this 
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study used an innovative approach that integrates classical and institution economic 
theories, and employ mixed econometric analytical approaches, accounting for 
transaction costs, institutions, and endogeinety problems to establish cause and effect 
relations. This approach allows understanding better the irrigation systems 
performance. The outcome of such insights can help researchers, development 
practitioners and policy makers in reaching consensus on performance evaluation 
indicators/criteria measurement in the Tanzanian irrigation systems performance.  
 
1.4     Objectives of the Study 
1.4.1  Main Objective 
The general objective of this study is to improve on understand the transaction costs 
of collective action and the factors behind the institutional quality influence on the 
rice irrigation systems performance in the Lake Victoria basin of Tanzania.  
 
1.4.2  Specific Objectives 
(i) To determine how self-selection effects and transaction costs, affect farmers’ 
participation in irrigation agro ecosystem in the study area.  
(ii) To identify factors influencing institutional quality in the groups of irrigation 
resource users.   
(iii) To assess the effect of CA transaction costs embeddedness for shared irrigation 
resources utilization on farmers’ allocation of factors of production. 
(iv) To determine how farm household varying objectives affect the extent of 
entrepreneurship of a household in enhancing CA coordination in irrigation 
system.  
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1.5    Hypotheses 
The study aim was to test the following four null hypotheses, which are derived from 
the literature, and are postulated to explain the efficiency working of CA in irrigation 
systems.  
(i)  Self-selection factors and transaction costs do not affect participation of 
farmers in irrigation ecosystem. 
(ii)  Transaction costs, market factors and rainfall characteristics do not influence 
institutional quality in irrigation group members. 
(iii)  Collective action does not affect farmers’ technical efficiency and allocation 
of production factors in the irrigation scheme.  
(iv) Household own individual investment decision in irrigation farming does not 
depend on enterprising orientation farming objectives. 
 
1.6  Significance of the Study 
This study is important and relevant to various stakeholders who are interested in 
economic development and growth, and those feel bad with the business as usual 
with regard to the waste of public funding investment in irrigation sub sector. It is 
important also in ensuring the value of money invested by inclusion of smallholder 
farmers’ participation in the mainstream economy on the resources utilization and 
management in general.   
 
At macro level policy formulation, the study is important to understand the 
challenges facing the irrigation development in the country and Sub-Sahara Africa 
(SSA) at large. For academia to understand and further follow up the debate on 
 11 
collective action functioning- framed along transaction cost and social capital 
theories combined with other complementary analytical approaches applied in 
classical economic theories. While for planners and other development practitioners 
it is important to understand and prioritize important critical success factors in the 
process to support the agricultural transformation effort envisioned, particularly 
understand and have consensus on irrigation systems performance evaluation 
indicators/criteria to be used in the provision of common pool resources. 
 
Of paramount importance, the study is directly useful at micro level, where 
smallholder farmers will profit most because the study aims at understanding 
decisions for households’ farm plan to enhance their livelihood improvement. The 
study will also contribute to the understanding of agricultural cooperatives and value 
chains coordination and management challenges. This will support sustainability of 
interventions by enhancing fully inclusion of different category of beneficiaries 
along the entire agri-chains 
 
1.7  Scope and Limitation of the Study 
The study covered only selected irrigation schemes in the Lake Zone water basin, 
hence observations of only one Zonal water basin management may not be sufficient 
to draw conclusive recommendations on irrigation systems performance in Tanzania. 
In addition, available information for institutional analysis is generally not directly 
measurable, hence a researcher was forced to construct (transform) own sets of data, 
and rely on proxies, which are sometimes only indirectly linked to the phenomenon 
under study. 
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1.8  Organisation of the Thesis 
The study consists of five chapters, which are organised to address the specific 
objectives outlined in section 1.3.2. Chapter one introduces the study and provides 
background information, problem statement, justification of the study, objectives, 
hypotheses, and outlines significance, scope and limitations of the study.  Chapter 
two presents literature review, which is organised into conceptual definitions, 
theoretical, empirical, and policy related literature review.  
 
Chapter three describes the methodology, and research design used in this study. It 
also explains data types, collection methods and the econometric analytical 
techniques used to analyse the data for each objective: Heckman sample selection 
two step is used to address objective one; Mixed effect model (fixed and random 
effect) was employed to address  panel data set based on linear regression for 
objective two;  standard stochastic frontier analysis was used to analyse technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency to answer objective three;  while instrumental 
variable strategy based on  two stage least square (2SLS) addresses objective four. 
 
Chapter four presents results and discussions of each specific objective and test of 
the hypotheses formulated. The chapter is made up of sub sections, which addresses 
results to answer the objectives and hypotheses tests. It starts by describing the 
characteristics of households, irrigators groups and irrigation systems characteristics 
in the study area, followed by presentation of analysis results.  The results are 
presented into four topics based on each objective as follow: 
 
First, the impact of self-selection effects on collective action is determined, and the 
sources of self-selection described to answer specific objective one. The hypothesis 
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that Self-selection factors and transaction costs do not affect participation of farmers 
in irrigation agro-ecosystem was rejected. 
 
Second, objective two results are presented under the sub section “factors influencing   
institution quality of CA in the irrigation systems”. Institutional variables- contract, 
contact and control in their proxies are analysed. The hypothesis that transaction 
costs as governance mechanisms, market factors and rainfall characteristics do not 
influence institutional quality in irrigation groups was rejected. 
 
Third, objective three consists of three aspects: technical efficiency, output elasticity 
and allocative efficiency issues. The production frontier, output elasticity and 
technical efficiency are estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimation method to 
answer the question of technical efficiency and output elasticity issues.  Allocative 
efficiency data were analysed using OLS estimation method.  Together, results are 
described in sub sections namely, empirical model estimates for the stochastic 
production frontier analyses, which present productivity parameters: technical 
efficiency, output elasticities and determinants of technical efficiency (technical 
inefficiency effects).  In addition, allocative efficiency to answer the question part of 
input factors allocation in the irrigation system is presented in this section to address 
same objective three. The hypothesis that collective action does not affect farmers’ 
technical efficiency and allocation of production factors in the irrigation scheme was 
rejected.  
 
Objective four is described under the sub section “the link between farm household 
objectives and enterprising tendency: implications on collective action coordination”. 
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The hypothesis that household own individual investment decision in irrigation 
farming does not depend on enterprising orientation farming objectives was rejected.  
Chapter five presents conclusion and recommendations both for policy and further 
research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Conceptual Definitions 
2.1.1  Collective Action 
Different authors have provided a variety of definitions   of collective action; which 
have encompassed a broad spectrum of aspects related to social, political, and 
economic group organisations context.  According to Olson, (1965, 1971) collective 
action is defined as the action taken by the  group of individuals through organisation 
in order to keep up the interest of their members.  Gillnson, (2004) defines collective 
action as the group of people with common purpose formed to benefit for the 
cooperation on the common good.  Similarly, for Holzinger, (2003), collective action 
refers to the joint actions of a number of individuals, which aim to achieve and 
distribute some gains through coordination and cooperation.  
 
However, despite of different perspectives regarding collective action explanation, 
the definition common to all is “the tendency for a group of people through 
organisation of shared interest to act together in pursuit of those interests’’. This 
thesis adapts the definition by Olson (1971), and Holzinger (2003), which both 
encompass distribution of gains and coordination aspects among members in the 
process of pursuit of their concerns.  
 
It is theoretically, and empirically accepted that individuals will join the group for 
collective action if the private benefits exceed the cost of cooperation (Olsen, 1965), 
and that individual not only considers private material benefits, but also non tangible 
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benefits offered by the collective action (Oliver, 2004). This thesis is based on this 
conceptual understanding to assess the transaction costs of collective action and 
institution quality in addressing the issues in the irrigation systems performance in 
Tanzania, particularly in the Lake Victoria basin. 
 
2.1.2  Transaction Cost  
The provision of collective action coordination and benefits in an economic system 
or social group interactions do not come freely, because of several kinds of 
imperfections and uncertainty among participants of the transaction. The 
imperfection and uncertainty originate from human rational interaction behaviour, 
which involve strategic decision making and maximization of pay off due to self-
interest behaviour. Consequently, they affect the outcome of strategic interactions 
(Binmore, 2007; Osborne, 2009).  
 
In order to undertake the transaction properly amongst participants in the collective 
action, a cost must be incurred to find out the opportunities and about the risks and 
uncertainties involved.  Such expenses/costs, which can be in the form of monetary 
(materials) or non-monetary costs like time, information cost, for running economic 
activities are called transaction costs (Tadelis and Williamson, 2010).  
 
According to Groenewegen et al. (2010) transaction cost refers to all costs, which 
have to be incurred when preparing, concluding and enforcing market, managerial 
and political transactions.  Coase (1937) defines transaction cost as that cost 
necessary to coordinate production processes, and that the magnitude of transaction 
cost depends on individual entrepreneur. Coase (ibid) assumes that the entrepreneur 
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can circumvent the uncertainties using price mechanism. Williamson (1979) 
transaction cost refers to the cost arising due to misaligned incentives, especially 
attributable to risks for the contractual party’s opportunistic behaviour, 
misappropriation of rents from transaction specific investment. Hence, the 
transaction cost arises due to critical dimensions of transaction costs characteristics: 
asset specific, uncertainty, and frequency. Dahlman, (1979) categorises the 
transaction costs into three scenarios (i) search and information cost (ii) bargaining 
and decision costs, and (iii) policing and enforcement costs, and that all these costs 
represent resource loss due to lack of information.  
 
Together, all these definitions are related and they represent unavoidable costs in any 
deal striking.  Thus, the definitions by Williamson (1979) and Dahlman (1979) are 
adapted in this thesis because these definitions   represent the focus of this study.  i.e. 
economic organisation by aligning transaction costs that cannot be traded in the 
market. In irrigation system, transaction costs could be defined as the costs of 
acquiring and handling the information about the mobilization of voluntary 
cooperation on irrigation infrastructure O&M as well as cost of ensuring water 
allocation and distribution (coordination/contact), water management and control, 
costs to ensure contributions of relevant costs and contracts compliances on the 
resource utilization (contract), and enforcement costs of contracts for resource users’ 
characteristics and reputation (respect of laws and regulations) on interactions 
(control/monitoring), and so on. TCs in this thesis are measured based on monetary 
costs, and end point (proxy) implementation outcome such as e.g. contact is 
measured in number of frequency of contact, contract is measured in terms of 
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compliance rate, and control is measured in terms of penalties implemented as 
enforcement mechanisms for working of the rules (institutions).       
 
2.1.3  Institutions and Institutional Quality 
The study of transaction cost is the core of institutions, and is important in studying 
coordination and organisational aspects. In English, the word institution has several 
meanings depending on the context. It includes, an established organisation; the 
building in which an organisation is hosted; and a custom, practice or rule 
(Groenewegen et al. 2010).  In this thesis the connotation related to custom, practice 
or rule is referred as implied in the common property rights, in order to understand 
how collective action works in the irrigation systems.  Other authors (Hodgson, 2006 
have defined institutions as the systems established and prevalent social rules that 
structure social interactions.  North, (1990) defines institutions as the humanly 
devised constraints that shape interactions, and in consequence they shape incentives 
for human exchange, whether political, social or economic.  Institution constraints 
include both what individuals are prohibited from doing, and sometimes under what 
conditions are allowed to undertake certain activities.  Institutions can be formal such 
as the rules, which human being devise and informal such as convention and codes 
of human behaviour. On the other hand, DFID, (2010) have defined institutions as 
formal and informal rules of the game that shape, but do not determine human 
behaviour in economic, political or social life. The DFID argument is that institutions 
are shaped, implemented and undermined or reformed by individuals and 
organisations; hence the outcome depends on how institutions interact with 
individuals and organisations. 
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At the same time, institution quality must possess strong characteristics that enforce 
property rights and bound by rule of law among other perceived incentives in order 
for the institution to work (DFID, 2010).  Groenewegen et al. (2010) point out two 
aspects of institution quality attributes: (i) sufficient percentage share of individuals 
must comply with the institutions, and (ii) there must be credible (enforceable) 
sanctions to prevent the rest of individuals to act against the norm.   
 
This thesis builds on Groenewegen et al (2010) institutional quality attributes 
definition, and adapts by merging concepts and insights of institution definitions 
described above. As a consequence, the institution quality is thus defined as a state of 
efficient contract enforcement, respect of property rights and by laws, and investors 
(irrigators) rights protection (Levchenko, 2006). Overall, amalgamation of the 
concepts of collective action, transaction costs, and institution quality described 
above allow understanding better the irrigation systems performance and collective 
action problem in particular.   
 
2.1.4  Irrigation System Performance 
According to Groenewegen et al. (2010) irrigation systems are categorized as 
common property resources because they are characterized by non-exclusiveness in 
that everybody has access to the resource, but have become rival because of scarcity, 
so if not well managed the performance is doomed. Common property resources 
need to have defined property status to prevent conflict and depletion thereby 
enhancing resource utilization and economic performance. Irrigation systems 
represent the entity of a common property regime, where there is a well-defined 
group whose membership is restricted, there is an asset to be managed, usually the 
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physical state of the resource/irrigation system, there is an annual stream of benefits 
through the use of irrigation water- which constitutes a valuable agricultural input, 
and there is a collective management for necessary maintenance of the system and 
process like O&M of infrastructures, water allocation, distribution and control to 
ensure efficient performance of the system that generate benefits intended to the 
users (Meinzen- Dick, 2004; Araral, 2008). 
 
Thus, the performance of irrigation system as a production unit is usually indicated 
or explained in terms of productivity and efficiency measurement. Fried et al. (2008) 
define productivity as the ratio of outputs of the production process to its inputs, 
while efficiency refers to the comparison between observed outputs and optimal 
outputs, and observed inputs and optimal inputs. These two concepts (productivity 
and efficiency) are usually used interchangeably in an overlapping way to explain 
performance, though they are slightly distinct. Productivity is a residual due to 
variations either across producing units or through time. The residual can be 
attributed to differences in production technologies, scale of operation, operating 
efficiency, or environment in which production occurs. Efficiency is a residual too, 
but it also requires the existence of a benchmark or comparison to the best practice.  
 
For example, in the efficiency measurement, optimum is defined in terms of 
production possibilities, or in terms of behavioural goal of the producer. In these 
events, efficiency in the former is technical, and in the later, efficiency is measured 
by comparing observed and optimum costs, revenue, profit (allocative), or whatever 
goal the producer is assumed to pursue. Thus, efficiency and productivity are success 
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indicators, which are performance metrics, by which producers or producing units 
are evaluated (Kumbhakar, and Lovel, 2000; Fried et al. 2008).  
 
 2.2  Theoretical Literature Review  
 Worldwide, natural resources management, particularly common natural resources 
(common pool resources) like irrigation systems management is studied based on 
collective action theory (Olson, 1965). The collective action (CA) consists institution 
design with principles, which are thought to motivate the successful resource 
management.  Some of these CA institution design principles consist of a list of 
attributes such as social identity and resource importance for users, availability and 
predictable condition for the resources e.g. irrigation system sustainable and 
functional predictable physical state, congruence between the rules linking social 
structure, ecology and technology, collective decision making, (Ostrom (2002, 
2010). These institutional designs are useful in explaining factors, which may 
influence collective action, but have overlooked the important characteristics 
underlying the interactions, and how actor can efficiently coordinate their 
undertaking (transaction) without friction. It is acknowledged that collective action 
theory seeks to understand how individuals in groups cooperate to undertake their 
common concern, given that they are self-interested and the conditions under which 
the interaction takes place is full of uncertainty (Olson, 1965; 1971). In order to 
transact safely, individual actors have to incur costs to find out where opportunities 
occur and about the possible risks and uncertainty; such these expenses are 
transaction costs (Groenewegen et al. 2010). These aspects have not been explicitly 
addressed in the theory of collective action.  
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Other theories related to common natural resources management stress on the 
importance of property rights in overcoming collective action problem (Wade, 1987).  
The argument is that individuals treat more carefully when they own the resource, 
because the returns generated by the possession of the resource accrue to them and 
not to others. This notion of property rights is important in rights appropriation 
(assigning property rights) to legitimize members on resource utilization there by 
excluding non-members, but not sufficient condition to overcome the problem of 
collective action, because an individual using the resource might not necessarily be 
the owner due to the right of disposal, the owner can legally transfer temporarily part 
of his/her bundle of property rights control to someone else. For example, renting out 
or in the land within the irrigation command area; hence this may result into 
inefficiency in contributions commitment because may not necessarily continue the 
activity in the subsequent period. In this regard, the theory of property rights has 
ignored the individual incentives, and other important drivers in the collective action 
coordination such as issues of self-selection effects, perceptions and non-tangible 
aspects, because group benefits are inherently shared based on lumped collective 
incentives in the common property rights (Oliver, 2004).   
 
However, Baland and Platteau (1996) put forward additional elements in the theory 
of property rights as facilitating factors to enhance overcome the collective action 
problem in the common. The additional elements are external forces such as aid, 
enforcement of rules, and leadership with broad experience. Similarly, the study, did 
not explore the extent of their effects on collective action and individuals’ 
preferences/choice. 
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Game theory is another paradigm, which has extensively been used to study the 
problems of collective action in the common pool resources management. The theory 
emphasizes on strategic interaction by observation of individuals’ behaviour, taking 
into account the decisions that others might make (Jehly and Reny, 2011).  A large 
variety of theoretical studies in the collective action problem in the common has 
been modelled as strategic form game (prisoner’s dilemma).  
 
In this respect, the argument is to overcome the prisoner’s dilemma, where the 
individual’s choice in aggregate, lead to the outcome that is not preferred by others 
(Binmore, 2007). This theory is particularly important in examining free riders’ 
problems where players (individuals) only care what they end up with.  Game theory 
is indeed good at observing individuals’ behaviour, but has shortfall in its 
construction- (assuming rational behaviour), because it does not tell what motivates 
individuals to behave how they are behaving. Yet, making moral judgements –either 
for or against is essential in overcoming collective action problem. 
 
On the other hand, the neo-classical economics theories tend to focus resource 
management around market mechanism (Kreps, 1990). That the price responds to 
factor scarcity resulting into factor substitutions, and ultimately resource 
management efficiency is achieved because scarcity will lead to higher price; hence 
stimulate investment and adjust to reach equilibrium. These assertions are rights, but 
cannot solve the problem of the common, especially on issues related to equity 
allocation (pro poor inclusion), because individuals interest is profit maximization 
rather than efficiency (Varian, 1987; Kreps, 1990). The theory implies that the 
market mechanism requires setting price based on supply and demand in line with 
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current resource utilization to achieve equilibrium. But, this is not the case because 
prices may be static or dynamic due demand conditions. For example, some resource 
users may require more resource than others, and willing to pay more due to self-
interest and heterogeneity in objectives and abilities.  
 
As such, excluded individuals may devise mechanisms like opportunism or free 
riding on resource utilization, and so inefficiency outcome remain unsolved. 
Therefore, this classical theory assumes zero transaction cost and that the perfect 
market exist that transmit sufficient information to the economic activities, yet, 
perfect market does not exist, particularly in developing countries like Tanzania, and 
that transaction costs are the costs of using the market mechanism as defined by 
Coase, (1937).  
 
At the same time, game theorists have also criticized the neoclassical paradigm in 
solving the problem of private provision of public/common goods in a collective 
action setting. They argued that neoclassical economic theories have limitations on 
the aspect of type of behaviour analysis, because they assume no syndicates and 
coalition are formed in the interactions, no cheating or lying is done, no threats or 
conflicts are made (Binmore, 2007; Jehle and Reny, 2011).  
 
Others theories have looked up collective action successfulness on the ground of 
private incentives in terms of materials or monetary benefits after harvest (Ostrom, 
2000); and sociological context based on motivating group action (Oliver, 2004; 
Diener and Seligman, 2004; Kassie et al. 2012). They asserted that materials in 
forma of tangible values such as payments, incentive for participation, or coercion 
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for not participation; and non-tangible values such as benefits or costs of 
participation arising from relationship with other people, networks, respect/honour, 
or feeling good in doing things together are likely to overcome the collective action 
problem.   
 
Together, the reviewed theoretical foundations have in common concentrated on 
creating collective incentives through institution design and sustainability of the 
resource- based on different approaches, but mostly comprised of price mechanism 
and game theoretic perspective. This is useful as a starting point of this research. 
Further the theories helped identification of other pitfall aspects, which have not 
previously been addressed in detail such as individual decisions (preferences and 
choice), and institution and organisational aspects in a combined way with regard to 
collective action successfulness.  
 
Thus this thesis extends beyond institution design to institutions impact by analysing 
in details the organisational and institutional embeddedness aspects of a CA in the 
context of individual incentives-framed in amalgamation form of wider theoretical 
variables framework. The amalgamated theories, which combine social capital 
paradigm, transaction costs economics, and transformation cost based on 
neoclassical economics paradigms, help to understand better how collective action 
problem can be solved. None of the previous theories succinctly reviewed have 
incorporated a mixture of theoretical perspective- a novelty in studying collective 
action problem in this thesis. This is particularly important because collective action 
problem involve many and diversity of variables (Agrawal, 2001), complex human 
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interactions (Ostrom, 2010) and competing theories as described above. Therefore, 
focusing on a single theory does not improve efficiency gain in this context.  
  
Transaction cost economics, and social capital- “fundamental to the collective action 
theory” provide the overall theoretical framework to guide the understanding issues 
of organisations and cooperation in this research.  North, (1990) theory is constructed 
on the basis of human behaviour, combined with transaction costs. The TCE is an ex-
post governance construction, with emphasis on transactions for which continuity or 
breakdown of the exchange relations is concerned, (Williamson, 2010). Governance 
is viewed as a means by which to infuse order there by mitigates conflict and realizes 
mutual gains. The TCE theoretical component is thus considered in understanding 
the economic organisation and institutional aspects related to human behaviour and 
identify factors, which predict successfulness in the CA to enhance irrigation systems 
performance. The social capital theory central premise is concerned with sociability 
relations, trust, networking, membership choices, and understanding, which facilitate 
cooperation (Narayan and Pritchett, 1999; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; Fafchamps, 
2002). Social capital has an important influence on the performance of societies at 
the economic, social, and political level organisations (Coffe and Geys, 2005).  
 
Theories of institutional economics analyse the organisation and institutions in 
different perspectives, which sometimes treat organisation as a sub group of 
institutions, or that organisation and institutions are two aspects (Chavance, 2011).  
North, (1990) put forward that organization and institutions are different aspects but 
interactive, while Common, (1934) asserts that organization and institutions 
represent two facets of one and the same phenomenon. Other scholars view 
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organization as a coordinative entity of various interactions, and as an enriching 
language of coordination (VAASA, 2012). This thesis adapts the definition by North, 
(1990) and VAASA, (2012) to analyze the transaction costs and institutions in 
collective action.  
 
In consequence, transaction cost economics is a core on institutions with established 
mechanisms to circumvent and constrain human behavior that generate transaction 
costs in the process of transaction. North, (1990) specifies institutions into formal 
rules and informal conventions or behavioral norms, plus the enforcement 
characteristics of both.  The formal rules usually exist in three levels (i) Fundamental 
rules derived from the basic human rights, (ii) legal system, which contains property 
rights and contract laws as well as the rules about the structure of the state and 
political decision making process, and (iii) the fundamental rules- that are both 
formal and informal, and the legal system, which together form the “institutional 
environment”. Within the institutional environment, individuals, and organizations 
(e.g. economic organizations like farmer organizations, firms or markets) enter into 
contracts (institutional arrangement) to coordinate their transactions, which 
eventually determine economic performance.  
 
On the other hand, informal rules or institutions can be defined as private rules of 
behavior that have been developed gradually and spontaneously and do not need any 
legal enforcement because the rules are sanctioned by the private parties themselves 
or because it is in the self-interest of the actors to follow the rules of their own 
agreement (Groenewegen et al.  2010). 
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This study builds on North (1990) and Williamson (1975, 2010), and Olson, (1965), 
Narayan and Prittchet, (1999) as well as the other studies by Wade, (1987), Baland 
and Platteau, (1996) and Ostrom (2000) and Agrawal, (2001), to construct variables 
relationship as explained in the subsequent conceptual framework section 2.4. 
 
2.3  Empirical Literature Review  
2.3.1  Transaction Cost Economics and Collective Action 
According to Williamson, (2005) transaction cost economics theory concentrates on 
the relative efficiency of different exchange processes. While, North, (1990) 
categorized the total costs of production into transformation costs- the cost of inputs 
involved in the transformation of physical resource into goods and services, and 
transaction costs- the cost of defining, protection and enforcement costs. North (ibid) 
then argued that a successful collective action has to be governed by a third part 
based on the institutions. Thus understanding the organization (coordination) and 
institutional performance require a thorough analysis of the transaction costs 
involved in the collective action as a tool for smallholder irrigation systems 
management. 
 
A body of literature on transaction cost economics (TCE) exists, and it is generally 
recognized that TCs are very important in determining the decision about economic 
organization and strategic management aspects (Kim and Mahoney, 2005).  
Transaction cost analysis can be applied to issues of irrigation systems management, 
because in many common resources, efficient management of common property 
rights that is granted collectively is often challenged by various sources of 
uncertainty that result in high transactions costs in the management (Bhattarai, 
 29 
2011). Resource users usually enter into various kinds of explicit and implicit 
agreements in order to initiate collective action and agree to exchange or transfer 
goods or services, which involve costs or contributions. These contributions are 
normally incurred in the form of negotiation, monitoring and enforcement costs, as 
part of resource utilization.  For example, the transaction costs for individual 
resource users, include the costs related to participation, opportunity cost of time 
involved in meetings, time required to acquire information and communication, 
direct monetary expenses e.g. costs for travel, communication like phones costs   and 
information or knowledge  search and acquisition-based on  training such as costs 
involved in attending trainings, seminars, and so on through extension advisory 
services or  other kind  of capacity building offering body.  At managerial level, the 
costs can be related to contact and contractual enforcement.  These costs are directly 
related to management of a collection action, and may foster or deter its 
successfulness and so do irrigation systems performance doomed.  
 
 Empirical evidence on transaction cost analysis has generated different results, 
which are sometimes contradictory. For example, scholars (Adhikari, 2001) studying 
transaction costs in collective action argue that CA benefits may be exceeded by 
transaction costs but are not explicitly felt in a situation where resource users see 
resource management as a way of their life rather than enterprise activities. While, 
Bhattarai, (2011), Jansen et al. (2014) agree that transaction costs such as 
information and communication matter in influencing the level of cooperation.  The 
contradictory arguments arise due to the fact that resource users attach/value 
differently the importance of the resources for their livelihood (Ostrom, 2010). It is 
 30 
also a result of heterogeneity in objectives and that collective action members are 
never having common interests that motivate them cooperate (Oliver, 2004).   
 
The focus of this thesis is to incorporate the transaction costs in understanding the 
collective action problem, which most of empirical research on economic analysis of 
the common have scarcely incorporated transaction costs.  Most previous studies 
have generally focused on the external factors (characteristics) affecting collective 
action, and evaluation of institution design principles effectiveness.  
 
They argue that characteristics of the resource like physical state conditions-
abundance or scarcity, the characteristics of resource users such as social identity 
(ethnicity, gender, and location), group size, and the institutional arrangement 
(governance) context like leadership and community or government control affect 
the likelihood of successful collective action (Ostrom, 2010, Araral, 2008: Mosha et 
al. 2014).  Studies that examined transaction costs are scanty (Meinzen Dick et al. 
(2000), and have put forward that group size as factor in influencing joint collective 
action represent a trade- off between potential economies of scale and increase in 
transaction costs. 
 
Although such studies identified important aspects in predicting factors influencing 
CA, they have limitation in that they did not adequately address in a linked way   the 
transformation costs- the physical cost- benefit position of enterprises (Ostrom, 
2010), and transaction costs imposed (contract, contact, and control) in regard to 
resource use. They have also not explicitly presented the extent and type of 
transaction costs related to group size. 
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On the other hand, Bhattarai, (2010) identified the type of transaction costs in farmer 
managed irrigation in Nepal on the basis of transactions undertaken by farmers, 
which included time of meeting in the formation of organization, and travel costs and 
statute preparation costs.  However, the study did not provide the extent of their 
effects on the irrigation performance.  
 
Human and resource use interactions and sociability aspects have extrinsic or 
intrinsic motivation for the household decision. According to social psychologists 
perspective ‘‘extrinsic motivation behavior is understood in terms of external forces 
such as monetary expectance, while, intrinsically motivated is otherwise because 
individuals wish to undertake a task for its own sake’’-This is likely a result of 
unobserved characteristics, which can be expressed in differences among households 
such as choice of the type of farming agro ecosystems, crops grown, inputs used and, 
and off farm engagement as a proxy indicator of entrepreneurial characteristics. 
These aspects are important in understanding the problems in CA and its 
organizational mechanisms, which are the subjects of this very study. 
 
Scholars, e.g. Kim and Mahoney, (2005) have emphasized that there exist   different 
ways to manage the transaction costs based on the nature and characteristics of 
transaction, which influence the transaction costs in the economic organization and 
strategic management where inefficient economic outcome occur. The transaction 
characteristics, which influence the transaction costs, have been classified into 
frequency relation, uncertainty in relation and Asset specificity (Willianmson, 2005; 
Groenewegen, 2010). These characteristics are presented in details in the subsequent 
section as described by Williamson (ibid). 
 32 
2.3.1.1 Frequent Relationships 
The exchange relationship may be one-time, occasional or recurrent; a frequent 
transaction (especially in the presence of asset specificity) is more likely to be 
internalised since expected damages from opportunistic behaviour are higher. 
Opportunism is self-interest with guile. The irrigation systems management require 
frequent transactions to reduce opportunistic behaviour for sustainable resource 
utilization. It is particularly important because if the interaction is repeatedly, then a 
“tit –for tat” reward and punishment can be achieved to enhance stable cooperation 
(Binmore, 2007). 
 
2.3.1.2 Uncertainty of Relationships  
As far as there is uncertainty, complete contracts cannot be foreseen and the firm 
making the specific investment is disadvantaged when future contingencies impose 
to re-negotiate the contract terms. Transaction cost theory individualises two kinds of 
uncertainty: environmental uncertainty that is unpredictability of future 
contingencies, and behavioural uncertainty, that is the possibility of monitoring the 
behaviour of the contracting party.   
 
In irrigation systems particularly, for the Tanzanian setting both uncertainties hold. 
The former involves unreliability and unpredictability of the resource physical state, 
which in turn creates uncertainty to resource users because irrigation systems 
hydrological functions depend on rainfall- which is erratic, and due to climate 
change results into variability, and the later is related to behavioural preferences of 
resource user members who have opportunistic characteristics syndicates, cheating, 
lying, and so on because of self-interest, but also bounded rationality-lack of 
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information with regard to the irrigation resource use and the  management in 
general.   
 
2.3.1.3   Asset Specificity  
Transaction cost is also important if different types of asset specificity have been 
detected such as physical capital specificity (when some particular machinery or 
assets like land-which have sunk cost if not used in irrigation system or if cannot be 
converted for alternative use), human capital specificity (when some members obtain 
specific knowledge of the technology and of the productive process and other 
members depend on them (interdependence), site specificity (when downstream 
farmers have unequal opportunities as upstream farmers such as distance or 
proximity to the water distribution or soil fertility status for  improving productivity 
or technical efficiency)- this may add or reduce transaction costs, dedicated assets 
(when some non-specific investments, made in view of the relationship, lead to 
excess capacity after the relationships has been broken), design specificity (when 
inputs are specifically designed for the particular resource use), and  temporal 
specificity (when timely performance is critical, and the failure to supply a particular 
input on schedule can cause interruptions of the production process (ibid). 
Consequently, efficient, adequate and timely water distribution is essential to cause 
high or low transaction costs which are necessary factors to influence decisions to 
promote or deter collective action efforts as argued. 
 
In general, CA is considered a tool that translates into efficient performance of 
irrigation systems. Yet, most studies have ignored transaction cost analysis, which 
are important elements in the CA successfulness (Araral, 2012; Bhattarai, 2012; 
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Marshall, 2013), and it also embodies non-tangible values (Oliver, 2004; Dercon et 
al. 2012). The transaction costs emerge as a linkage within the institutions and others 
between social, economic, and environmental/ecological interactions with resource 
users. Thus, it is important to understand the transaction cost economics in order to 
derive institutional analysis for the collective action. It is therefore against these 
theoretical and empirical contexts that set the scene and provide motivation for this 
research.     
 
2.3.2  Groups, Preference, and Ecological Uncertainty Context in CA 
In irrigation systems, an organized user group in a collective action (CA) reflects 
efficient irrigation performance because all members have exclusive rights to make 
use of the irrigation facilities and services in such a way that renders maximum 
utility. Based on conceptual definitions of collective action above, authors have 
defined CA in several ways, but the definition common to all is “the tendency for a 
group of people with shared interest to act together in pursuit of those interests’’ 
(Oliver, 2004; Araral, 2008; Becker, 2012). Consistent with this literature, CA is all 
about groups, membership and institutions.  
 
Therefore, group’s characteristics are important in defining membership 
attachment/affiliation and the way individual resource users integrate and behave in a 
CA under certain institutional arrangement (North, 1990; Sokile et al. 2005; 
Leucoutere, 2010).  Memberships to group in irrigation systems may help farmers 
easily interact themselves, mobilize collective labour and management, and associate 
with other external development agents like extension services and other relevant 
supports such as technologies accessibility to enhance economic activities outcome.  
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Scholars have stressed the importance of groups as a capital that can positively or 
negatively influences the outcome of economic activities through a link of aspects 
which constitute prediction factors of CA such as collective identity, social structure 
characteristics like group stability, and trustworthy, among others (Narayan and 
Pritchett, 1999; Becker, 2012). These previous studies, however, did not examine in 
detail the pattern of management and the embeddedness aspects as a result of 
interactions such as transaction costs and non-tangible benefits like information 
sharing, helpfulness, and other perceived beliefs related to social structure, e.g. 
respect of regulations and law. These factors might influence collective action 
successfulness for group functioning, and farmers’ self-selection into different 
farming types, such as irrigation or rain-fed agriculture.  
 
Similarly, on one hand, ecological (environmental) uncertainty resulting from 
climate variability that is reflected on rainfall amounts and seasonal timing variations 
has an implication on resource economic conditions, which in turn influences 
farmers’ coping strategy to sustain their livelihood in different geographical locations 
(Mary and Majule, 2009). Accordingly, geographical location has an important 
influence on the characteristics of farming systems like ecology, hydrology, 
technology adoption, and livelihood opportunities, which directly affect farm 
household income, and indirectly through its impact on market integration or 
institutional quality (Rodrik et al. 2002) such that farmers can make use in their 
decisions to promote or deter CA working.  
 
 Household preferences usually determine the differences in livelihood 
strategies/plans undertaken among resource users (Berkhout, 2009). These 
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differences in livelihood strategies are likely to be a result of largely unobserved 
differences in household objectives, expressed in terms of types of crops grown, 
inputs used/ entrepreneurial skills, off farm activities engagement, and investment 
choices/decisions. The relative preferences of livelihood strategies and plan may 
vary among household’s objectives and relate to differences in efforts/motivation 
towards CA. In economic organization theory, motivation is multi-dimensional 
(Grandori, 2013) therefore systematic preferences based on standard utility 
maximization approach may not necessarily represent rationality in preference. 
These issues/factors have received less scrutiny in the previous collective action 
studies in the irrigation systems research. 
 
Largely, group characteristics, household preferences and the ecological uncertainty 
play important role in collective action problem analysis. Agrawal, (2001) 
summarized the characteristics from the work of Ostrom (2000), Baland and 
Platteau, 1996) and Wade, (1987) which influence collective action.  Some of the 
characteristics include resource users’ characteristics, characteristics of the resource, 
resource importance to users and clearly defined property rights, collective decisions, 
higher level authority recognize the right of appropriator to self-governing, which 
most previous studies have been focused towards institution design.   
 
Globally, theoretical and empirical evidence related to CA on natural resources 
management has generated different results, some are contradictory arguments. For 
example, Naidu (2005), on his study of forestry resources management in India, 
indicated that CA under heterogeneity in social identity of the group would be 
unlikely. Yet, in Ethiopia, heterogeneity in social identity was not an important 
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factor (Tesfaye et al. 2012). For resource importance for users’ livelihood, Wade 
(1988) for example, disagrees with Ostrom, (2000) and other scholars that a given 
natural resource is not necessarily important to users’ livelihood, because the 
resource may not be required by users themselves because of preference or 
accessibility.   
 
Other scholars studied livelihood diversity have also noted that “most households in 
developing countries rely on diversified income sources as a way of avoiding risks’’ 
(Ellis, 1999; Berdegue and Escobar, 2002), and there is consensus that diversification 
improves income and contributes significantly to poverty reduction in rural areas 
(Dethier, and Effenberger, 2012). Based on institutional design, scholars have argued 
that due to environmental uncertainty, management institutions for CA in forestry, 
water and grazing land were weak or absent in Tanzania (Quinn et al. 2007). But, in 
Trinidad and Tobago, CA in fisheries, watersheds and zone management were strong 
in order to mediate environmental uncertainty problems (Tompkins and Adger, 
2004).  Altogether, these studies did not examine in detail other factors embedded in 
the collective action successfulness such as preferences and transaction costs.  
 
Consistent with this literature, CA like any other economic venture involves 
individual farmer preferences and valuations of several factors such as benefits and 
overview of barriers like transaction costs and riskiness in a way of entrepreneurship 
orientation. At the same time other neoclassical economics scholars have also 
justified successfulness of economic undertaking on the basis of entrepreneurship 
behavior. That personality or individual farmer cognitive characteristics and 
economic factors like transformation and transaction costs explain why some exploit 
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opportunities and others do not (Markman and Baron, 2003; Carolis and Saparito, 
2006; Groenewegen et al.2010).  
 
Generally, most of these different views among scholars are complementary, and 
provide evidence that CA theories might be location specific, and embodies 
entrepreneurship decisions, among other factors described above.  
 
2.4    Irrigation Systems Policy Context  
Common property rights granted to water resource users groups in the irrigation 
systems management has been the policy instrument implemented to ensure efficient 
resource management in most developing countries where common resources 
management has been decentralized to the community.  The National water sector 
policy (NAWAPO, 2009) and the water resources management Act No 11 of 2009 
provide for the water use rules and water users association formation guidelines. For 
example, membership is only to a person who lives in the village or water body 
system, and own plot within the irrigation scheme. This, policy guides the selection 
of members’ recruitment for the CA automatically, provided a person owns plot(s) 
and lives in the village. This policy guide apparently prevents other members from 
irrigation farming participation because of poor mode of membership selection.   
 
In consequence, the policy deters CA successfulness because it does not clearly 
indicate whether users have to be affiliated into membership based on willingness to 
participate in the irrigation farming, neither does not tell under what personal 
attributes or attitudes-which are usually unobserved should be taken into account. 
Yet, it emphasizes that groups- in a collective action setting are expected to translate 
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into efficient performance of irrigation resource management, which is not realistic 
because of heterogeneity in objectives and attitudes (Berkhout, 2009).  In general, 
this policy has failed to generate efficiency in irrigation systems performance in 
Tanzania.  
 
Worldwide at micro level; community managed irrigation systems performance 
measurements have covered various indicators depending on the extent at which the 
irrigation stakeholders (farmers or agencies) achieve their objectives. The commonly 
considered valuable indicators which are thought to cover all stakeholders objectives 
have centred on several factors/indicators: the extent of farmers participation, nature 
and mode of water distribution, maintenance of the system, water use efficiency, 
profitability of the system (benefit- cost ratio, internal rate of return), sustainability 
of the system and technology cost in relation to increased benefits and productivity 
(Kadigi et al. 2004), conflict management, and organisational dynamics and 
institutional strength (Manor and Chambouleyron, 1991).  
 
Other scholars, like Gorantiwar, and Smout (2005) have also suggested four 
indicators: economic- which is in terms of productivity as influenced by water 
resource use; social in terms of equity in resource allocation; environmental as 
related to sustainability which is reflected on upgrading, maintaining and degradation 
of the environment; management in terms of reliability, adequacy, efficiency and 
flexibility in water distribution.  
 
Largely, in SSA the performance indicators assessed at micro level for smallholder 
farmers’ irrigation systems have generally covered irrigated agricultural output, 
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water supply and financial returns (You et al, 2010). On the hand, assessment 
indicators at macro level have covered presence or absence of institutional features 
like, existence of specialized agency for basin level management, separate 
infrastructure development from agricultural management, water user association 
power/authority, existence of irrigation country strategy and action plan (Svendsen et 
al. 2008). 
 
In Tanzania, micro level smallholder irrigation systems performance indicators have 
mainly focused on irrigation systems hardware, which include engineering and 
infrastructures design regarding water flow, and agronomic conditions based on crop 
suitability and yield outputs, cultivated land size under irrigation, and participation of 
farmers (NIPO, 2009; Msuya and Isinika, 2011, NAPO, 2013). Clearly, all together, 
these indicators are important in explaining performance of the irrigation systems, 
but measures based on CA organisational mechanisms and institution quality, as a 
software in irrigation systems are useful, which is the subject of this research.   
  
To a large extent, CA studies on performance of irrigation systems have been done in 
Latin America and Asia. Most studies have focused on equitable allocation and 
sustainable use of water resources. They used designs, like case study and game 
theoretic approaches (Ostrom, 2002, 2010; Janssen et al., (2012). Other studies have 
used econometrics to identify factors that explain joint actions (Meinzen-Dick, 2000; 
Araral, 2008). These studies provide useful insights on features like strategic 
interdependence, heterogeneity in wealth, group size, and social identity as building 
blocks on cooperation among farmers. But these studies have the shortcoming in that 
they did not adequately capture some of subjective factors such as perceived risks 
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and non-tangible benefits, because the capture of information is normally structured 
based on rationality of farmers’ decisions, rather than what actually farmers decide to 
do, or what they want (Binmore, 2007). They have not also captured issues like 
continuity or breakdown of the exchange relations that account for transaction costs, 
unobserved differences/ heterogeneity in household objectives, and the governance 
aspects.  Furthermore, case study designs employing qualitative approach have the 
limitation that external validity is low because they do not permit test of the 
hypothesized factors (Meinzen-Dick, 2004).   
 
In Sub Saharan Africa, existing studies on CA examine the implications or 
robustness of local institutions involving water, forestry and grazing land (e.g. 
Cleaver, 2001; Quinn et al. 2007; Deneke et al. 2011; German et al, 2012). They 
indicated limitations of local institutions to cope with priority changes such as 
conflict resolution, and equitable CA. Recently, Komakech et al. (2012) provide 
insights on how local institutions emerge to facilitate CA in one of a small water 
catchment area in Tanzania, involving farmers from one village. They argued that a 
combination of inequality and interdependence of resource users explain sustained 
CA.  Altogether, these case studies are useful as a starting point and building block 
of this research, though they do not explicitly tell the relations between transaction 
costs (management), environmental/ecological uncertainty, and local institution 
functioning in regard to household preferences and decisions as argued.  
 
2.5  Conceptual Framework and Research Gap 
This study considers collective action as a complex economic entity that comprises 
actors with different interests but organised to have common concern in order to 
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pursue their diverse interests under external and internal forces.  As the main interest 
in this study is transaction costs (institutions) and organisation aspects of the CA, the 
remainder of this section conceptualizes the variables focusing on actors (household) 
decisions process in the interaction. Figure 2.1 gives a schematic representation of 
the process.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: A Framework for the Analysis of Collective Action Organisation 
and Institutions in Irrigation Systems Management 
Source: Adapted and modified from Ostrom, (2010)  
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combination of variables derived from different theoretical and empirical insights.  
The framework is based on TCE, Social Capital (SC), and neo classical economics 
theories with extensions and cross linkages of variables. 
 
In Figure 2.1, reading from left to right as shown by continuous arrows, the 
assumption is that the external forces, which include environmental (ecological) 
uncertainty resulting from rainfall variability, policy issues and input-output markets, 
and support services conditions, and local conditions such as agro-ecology, 
institutional environment (formal and informal rules), economic opportunities and 
common natural resource condition (resource physical state), plus the internal force, 
(the CA interaction) constitutes the transaction costs, social capital and institutions, 
in addition to the household characteristics, set the scene to initiate CA interaction 
process, which yield the outcome.  
 
Together, the processes trigger/generate motivation for the farming system type 
choices based on membership demand /self-selection effects outcome, rooted from 
economic argument.  At the same time, household characteristics set off the 
decisions on farm plans and livelihood strategies or adjustments outcome with direct 
influence from local conditions especially ecology, economic opportunities, and 
institutions environment, while feedback on CA interactions are also possible.  
 
Finally, the decisions of the farm plan and livelihood strategies, direct influence of 
environmental uncertainty, and partly, household characteristics as indicated by the 
dotted lines lead to efficiency performance of the irrigation systems in terms of 
group functioning/ coordination and institution quality, and physical resource 
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allocations (transformation), technologies use (perception), accessibility outcomes, 
and hence CA acceptable and successfulness is achieved.  
 
More specifically, the variables relationship is conceptualized and grouped into four 
key elements: (i) membership; (ii) Institution quality and rainfall & market 
uncertainty; (iii) Resource allocation efficiency & technology use perception; and 
(iv) Investment/enterprising tendency as indicated by the continuous and doted 
arrows in Figure 2.1. The variables are explained along with research gap in the 
remainder of this section. 
 
 2.5.1  Membership 
The national water sector policy of 2009, and water resource management act no 11 
of 2009 stipulate that membership in water resource utilization is only to a person 
who lives in the village or nearby water body system, and own a plot within the 
irrigation scheme. This implies that the boundary is restricted and hence members’ 
recruitment is also bounded. In this regard, the selection of members’ affiliation is 
automatic provided a person holds a plot/land within the irrigation scheme 
(NAWAPO, 2009).  
 
This is in line with one of the Ostrom’s design principles attribute, but such 
institution design has pitfalls in that it did not take into account the effect of self-
selection bias- a subject in this thesis. Self-section effect can have positive or 
negative impact on the collective action successfulness because individuals are 
affiliated into membership without best recruitment criteria. It might be that 
individuals merely participate in the irrigation systems because of sampling bias, yet 
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have no common interest in joining the CA, the situation which increases CA 
problem in the common resource. 
 
Thus, “implicitly” or “explicitly’’ the decision whether a farmer chooses to be a 
member of irrigation water users’ association group in a given farming ecosystem is 
likely influenced by governance characteristics and transaction costs among other 
economic endowment, like land ownership or hiring and a priori expectation of 
results from the proportion of area sown over cultivated within the irrigation 
command. Governance characteristics can be order (e.g. cohesion or conflicts) and 
arrangements such as coordination, e.g. communication and monitoring strategies, 
which make use of formal or informal rules in the transaction relations (Williamson, 
2005; Deneke et al. 2011). Thus, the framework is constructed along the utility 
maximization theory based on attributes of groups (e.g. coordination and regulations 
like social network, leadership styles and discretion e.g. frequency of meetings and 
accountability, and institutional design principles, e.g. collective choice like respect 
of laws/bylaws and compliance, as well as transaction costs such as contact, contract 
and control in their respective proxies (price and non-price) to identify how farmers 
self –select into the farming ecosystem type. Self-selection can produce endogeneity 
bias occurring in simultaneity way where the explanatory variable is also a function 
of the dependent (outcome) variable (i.e. a cause and effect.  
 
In this setting, it is assumed that for a successful CA a farmer in the irrigation group 
chooses irrigation farming type, given that he/she also value or depend on irrigation 
farming for livelihood sustenance- implying that factors affecting selection into the 
type may simultaneously affect the outcome of interest. This kind of modelling 
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enables capturing the appropriate farmers committed to participate in the irrigation 
systems. 
 
2.5.2  Institutional Quality, Market Characteristics and Rainfall Uncertainty  
Along this dimension, environmental uncertainty resulting from climate variations, 
which leads to rainfall variability, in combination with market characteristics and 
governance mechanisms are conceptualised as a framework to study group’s 
institution quality. Irrigation water in Tanzania depends on rainfall to keep various 
irrigation schemes in different hydrological boundaries live operations. 
Understanding the interactions between climate variations e.g. rainfall variability 
levels (mm), market function characteristics e.g. output market access/outlet, prices, 
and managerial strategies like contact, contract compliance and control mechanisms 
can provide more insight on CA working and institutional quality. 
 
The framework is centred on irrigation systems’ resource attributes based on 
reliability and levels of rainfall, resource user’s property rights and enforcement 
mechanisms of institution in their various forms of proxies constructed from 
transaction costs end point outcome of implementation results. The transaction costs 
end point outcome such as contact costs, control costs like number penalties 
implemented based on formal or informal rules enforcement, and contract outcome 
results such as compliance rate on agreements made.   
 
Others included the output market characteristics like output market access/outlet 
and spatial output prices. These aspects are analysed in order to understand factors 
influencing institution quality/efficiency over time. The analytical framework is 
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based on generalized linear regression models of panel data set. The panel data 
analytical approach is used because can best control for differences among irrigation 
schemes, which may be caused by characteristics that differ among schemes 
(Baltagi, 2012). 
 
2.5.3  Resource Allocation Efficiency & Technologies use Perception 
The interaction between CA and farm plans based on feedback mechanisms framed 
in the context of farmers’ attitude/perceptions on factor inputs adoption and 
irrigation services access, acceptability and application is another framework.  
Common natural resources management theory does not explicitly indicate the 
conditions necessary to trigger full resource allocation and utilization efficiency (i.e. 
CA and farm plan resource use), apart from physical state–“abundance or scarcity of 
common resources”. Technique that extends beyond physical state of the resource 
(irrigation system) to include technical capacity, and behavioural aspects (perception 
of technology use for resource users under CA setting) was implemented to 
understand the drivers of CA successfulness.  
 
The fact that CA has both non-tangible and tangible values provides the basis for the 
framework. Non-tangible values can be aspects like information sharing or 
networking that may benefits a farmer in technology or resource use, e.g. use of CA 
as a bridge to access external support services. Previous studies on farmer 
cooperation have justified the role of non-tangible benefits in influencing willingness 
to cooperate (McMahon, 2015). Others have confirmed that non-tangible benefits 
like membership to group may enable farmers’ technical knowledge to use 
technology (adoption) through other farmers and support services (Martins et al. 
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2010; Ndunda and Mungatana, 2013). Similarly, tangible values include economic 
incentives in form of private property after harvest (Ostrom, 2000) or well- being, 
using money or income as a surrogate indicator measure which motivates 
individual’s participation (Diener and Seligman, 2004; Kassie et al. 2012). 
According to social psychologists ‘‘extrinsic motivation behaviour is understood in 
terms of external forces such as monetary expectance, whereas intrinsically 
motivated individuals wish to undertake a task for its own sake’’. These factors are 
important as fundamental aspects in successfulness of CA, which in previous studies 
have not adequately been given attention in irrigation research. 
 
Economic theory of production based on technical efficiency and allocative 
efficiency, combined with TCE and social capital theories were used to architecture 
the interactions which, was designed in terms of clustered factors: external factors 
determining use and accessibility conditions of irrigation services as a proxy for CA 
management efficiency, technology characteristics, and users behaviour (motivation 
and perceptions on the technologies use such as output price incentives and risk 
perception to understand the CA successfulness.   
 
2.5.4  Investment/Enterprising Tendency 
Finally, the fourth objective explored in detail the influence of farm household 
objectives on the investment enterprising tendency as an incentive for collective 
action (CA) coordination efficiency in the irrigation system. CA is related to 
management success and member patronage, at the same time most capital asset 
expenditures by a farmer in irrigation systems are sunk cost in case not used, or if are 
firm specific that have no alternative use (Aramyan et al. 2007). Accordingly, famers 
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face dilemma in decision making because of uncertainty resulting from water 
management and control variations (NIPO, 2009), and disregard of bylaws (Rajabu 
and Mahoo, 2008), which as a result create free riding and opportunistic behavior 
operating environment amongst water resource users. 
 
Alongside, household preference (which is latent and only observed by actions) 
usually determine the differences in livelihood strategies (plans) undertaken among 
resource users. These differences in livelihood strategies (driven by their objectives) 
are likely to be a result of largely unobserved household characteristics, expressed in 
terms of differences among household endowment and enterprising tendency 
(choices) such as investment judgment, farming orientation, inputs used, off farm 
activities engagement, and valuation and choice of accessible economic activities/ 
opportunities against irrigation system through implicit ranking.    
 
Enterprising tendency (entrepreneurship) plays a greater role in driving 
organizational coordination functions of firms (Maharati and Nazemi, 2012). In its 
entirety, entrepreneurship covers a broad spectrum ideas and definitions ranging 
from occupational, innovation, and business creation to organization /coordination 
point of views (Hall and Sobel, 2006; Jos and Bart, 2008; Soriano, 2010).   
 
Although, a good body of literature on entrepreneurship exist, all together, have 
concentrated on the role of entrepreneurship, but the contribution to the firm 
coordination has been neglected or else not clearly tackled. This thesis links 
entrepreneurship and coordination. Entrepreneurship has been defined as a 
judgmental decision making over deployment of assets in face of uncertainty and 
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bringing about coordination of the firm- an irrigation system (Jos and Bart, 2008; 
Maharati and Nazemi, 2012). The firm (irrigation system) as an organisation is 
dedicated to the planning of sustainable resource utilization based on information 
synthesis and operating environment by the entrepreneurial founder (resource users), 
and is effected more by its managerial organization embedded in an institution 
framework of CA. Thus, The CA institution (management) and government 
guidelines define the property rights for entrepreneurs’ resource utilization in the 
irrigation systems. 
 
This research is framed within the context of combined farm household objectives, 
transaction costs, and governance related factors such as group leadership style to 
understand enterprising tendency as an incentive for coordination of CA. The 
enterprising tendency is measured in terms of own annual irrigation expenditures 
committed for irrigation farming, to imply that the price or cost (investment) of the 
resources used by the entrepreneur reflects the opportunity cost of their employment 
in other uses (Hall and Sobel, 2006). The implication is that the higher the capital 
asset invested the higher the motivation for ensuring firm coordination efficiency in 
order to safeguard losses would be for the investment made.   
 
On the other hand, farm household objectives are operationalized in the context of 
economic motivation hierarchy structure as in Kallas et al., (2009), which are 
measured as dummy values of commercial or subsistence farming objectives. 
Transaction costs and governance related factors are measured in their various 
respective proxies. The framework is thus centered on management theory of 
investment that account for farm and personal characteristics (Aramyan et al. 2007), 
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and farm household investment (e.g. Barnum and Squire, (1979) that explains the 
household as both producer and consumer under imperfect markets, and 
entrepreneurship theory, which is built in from firm and transaction cost economics 
theories- that portrays an organization- embedded in the institution framework of CA 
management (Casson, 1998; Williamson, 2005). These combined theories provided 
the basis to investigate the linkages between the farm household objectives and 
decisions on investment enterprising tendency, which is assumed as a locus of CA 
acceptability and economic organization coordination successfulness.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1  Description of the Study Areas 
The study was conducted in the Lake Victoria water basin (LVB) in 2014 covering   
seven irrigation schemes hosted in each of the five districts named in brackets: 
Mahiga irrigation scheme (Ngudu), Igongwa (Misungwi), Nyida (Shinyanga rural), 
Maliwanda and Nyatwali (Bunda), and Cheleche and Irienyi (Rorya). These districts 
have different agro ecological system defined by different farming system zonation 
(FSZ) that is characterised by the interactions of cultural, agro-biological aspects like 
dominant soil types, rainfall distribution and socio economic factors such as input-
output markets, own farmers’ priority on crops cultivated and resources capabilities.  
Because of good correlation between local soils, parent materials, landforms, 
historical settlement patterns and current local farming systems, the Zonation is 
based on land unit approach, in which soils and physiography played a dominant role 
(Van Kekem, 1999). These selected districts have also more or less homogeneous 
characteristics on other aspects related to culture, crops grown particularly, in the 
irrigation schemes and the input-output market characteristics. 
 
In terms of irrigation schemes characteristics, Mahiga, Igongwa and Nyida irrigation 
schemes are traditional improved schemes, whose depend on temporary rivers for 
their water source.  Maliwanda, Cheleche, and Irienyi are also traditional improved 
scheme with reservoir/ dams constructed to collect rain water during the season.  
Nyatwali irrigation scheme is traditional, which uses electrical pump for water 
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abstraction from the main source of water, which is the Lake Victoria; hence it is the 
only irrigation scheme that operates all year round in the lake zone selected schemes.   
 
3.2  Research Design, Data Collection and Analysis 
3.2.1  Research Design 
 A comprehensive field survey that combined two types of data generating 
approaches: cross sectional and panel data set (repeated observations) designs were 
implemented to address the different objectives. The first approach involved cross 
sectional design that was engaged to study the individual farmers and groups’ aspects 
at household level.  
 
The study relied on primary information collected to cover mainly the governance, 
transaction costs, technology characteristics and the social capital variables in the 
form of their various proxies.  Farm household was used as a unit of observation for 
the analysis. To identify the causality, the design compared farmers participating in 
the irrigation farming by creating clusters during analysis: those engaged in irrigation 
and value CA; those engaged in both irrigation and rain fed in each of the scheme 
surveyed.  
 
The second approach involved the use of longitudinal (panel data design) survey at 
irrigation group level, relying on secondary information recorded by irrigation 
group’s organisation (management) over time.  Group level was used as a unit of 
observation for the analysis. The data set covered a period of 10 years (from 2003-
2012) to compare groups dynamics and individual effects (heterogeneity) on 
institution quality across the schemes over time period.  
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3.2.2  Sampling Design and Sample Size  
The survey employed a multi stage sampling procedure based on two stages 
approach. First, purposive sampling was used to obtain a total of 7 irrigations 
schemes-both traditional and modern which are distributed along Lake Victoria 
water basin in the five districts described above.  
 
The selection criteria for the irrigation schemes were based on the potential 
functional (operational) of the irrigation facilities, and age of the scheme (that is, has 
been working/operational for the past 5-10 years or so) in order to capture the 
dynamic conditions.  
 
The second stage involved survey respondents’ selection, targeting farmers involved 
in the irrigation farming. From each scheme, one farmer irrigation group/ water 
users’ association- for group level analysis, and 30 farm households- participants in 
the irrigation farming only and those engaged in both irrigation & rain fed farming, 
in addition to off farm activities engagement -for individual household level analysis 
were randomly sampled. In total 7 irrigation groups (100% response rate), and 
initially 210 households were thought, however, 184 households, about 87.6% 
response rate was reached after data cleaning. 
 
3.2.3  Data Collection Methods 
The empirical results presented in this thesis are based on two types of data 
collection methods: primary cross sectional data set, obtained at household level; and 
longitudinal/panel data set (repeated observations over the same unit of analysis), 
which is secondary data set obtained at group level records in each irrigation scheme. 
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3.2.3.1 Panel Data Set Collection 
The panel data set collected was unbalanced (i.e. data were not observed/recorded for 
each group in the irrigation scheme in every time period considered) obtained to 
address objective two. Data collection was done in a total of seven irrigation schemes 
drawing information from water users groups in each irrigation scheme. Data were 
collected using a well-prepared record sheet (form), which obtained recorded 
information by the scheme over the period of ten years (2003-2013).  
 
The main panel data set collected were obtained in the form of ‘’end point 
implementation outcome of transaction costs’’ (contract, contact and control 
mechanisms) in their various forms of proxy. 
 
3.2.3.2 Primary Cross Sectional Data 
This data set consisted of household information to address objectives 1, 3 and 4, 
which were transformed and constructed to suit answering each objective. A 
household survey was implemented involving face-to-face interview using structured 
questionnaire to capture information from the household head involved in the 
irrigation farming.  Where the head of household was not available, a spouse or 
household member involved in the irrigation farming was interviewed to represent 
the household head. Data types collected are presented in the remainder of this 
section (3.2.3.3) along with analysis method for each objective. 
 
3.2.4  Data Analysis Methods  
The analysis of data has used a variety of methodological approaches employing 
different econometric techniques to answer each of the specific objectives. In the 
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following section the particular data types and analysis method are described along 
with the objective addressed. 
 
3.2.4.1 Objective One: Heckman Two Step Sample Selection Technique  
Objective one aim was to explore the determinants of how farmers self-select into 
irrigation farming types, and describe their characteristics and effects on CA. 
Heckman sample selection technique was employed to answer this objective. Based 
on the theoretical foundation of self-selection analysis technique as described by 
Heckman, (1979), the dependent variable data type was constructed to suit two step 
choices: choice made in accordance with farmer types as the first step, and 
measurement of those farmers who chose the farming type if they value/ depend on 
the choice based on their observed and unobserved characteristics (abilities, 
preferences and attitudes).  
 
The outcome variable (farming type)  1y  data were measured as dummy variables; 
either the farmer chooses/select into type or not (coded as 1= irrigation and 0= 
otherwise), given that they value the choice or not as measured in perceived 
responses on irrigation rreliance  2y defined as 1= depend on irrigation, 0= 
otherwise. 
 
The independent variables were constructed from data set/information related to 
household characteristics, and irrigation group characteristics. The former included 
measurements of the appreciation of non-tangible benefits like information sharing 
(in frequency), farmer to farmer helpfulness, and “respect for the law” or 
commitment, and the latter included proxies for group regulations/ management 
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(transaction costs) and governance (leadership style and managerial discretion) like 
number of meetings convened, and contract compliance rates which were captured in 
a likert scale technique in the survey based on factor reduction analytical approach to 
ascertain individual’s commitment behaviour  on O&M in a CA setting.   
 
The analysis involved estimation of probit Heckman selection model, which controls 
for self- selection to identify factors that explain the choices made by farmers. The 
idea is that factors affecting selection into the type may simultaneously affect the 
outcome of interest; this situation motivated the use of probit Heckman selection 
model. Probit models are based on utility maximization theory, which is centred on 
consumer preferences. Based on utility maximization, we assume that the optimal 
expected utility 1U  if the utility exceeds a certain threshold level of preference for 
the choices made by the farmer given that they value such particular choice.  
 
The modelling proceeds in a sequential process, where individuals first decide 
whether to choose in the farming type under question (
1y ) based on the underlying 
and unobserved expected utility y*.  After the choice is made, then decide whether to 
value the choice or not (endogenous variable, 2y ), again based on unobserved 
expected utility y*. The analysis proceeded by implementing the two- step 
procedures as proposed by Heckman (1979). 
Mathematically, the model is represented as; 
 1111 1 exy   ……………………………………………………………….....(1) 
 2222 1 exy    ……………………………………………………………….. (2) 
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Where, equation (2) is the sample selection equation and 
1y  is observed only when  
12 y  
21, xx  = vectors of explanatory variables, which require at least one variable in 
2x that determines selection, should not be in 1x  
21,ee  = is a zero mean unit variance bivariate normal random variable with corr 
),( 21 ee  
21, = parameters to be estimated. 
 
3.2.4.2 Objective Two: Mixed Effect Linear Model  
This objective aimed at understanding how and to what extent the governance/ 
institution mechanisms implemented like contact, control based on property right 
enforcement legitimacy, market characteristics, and rainfall variability affect the 
institutional quality (compliance) in the group over time.  Mixed effect modelling 
technique was employed to analyse the data to answer the objective. 
 
Data types required were generated from panel set recorded in repeated backward 
observations for the period of 10 years (2003-2012), which were obtained from 
schemes’ records. The data set consisted of ex-post transaction costs, and other 
external factors like market characteristics and rainfall variability, which were 
constructed to suit mixed effect linear regression model to identify factors 
influencing institutional quality within and between irrigation schemes.  Main data 
were based on ex-post TCs, which have various forms: the cost of contracting 
(compliance); cost of negotiating or search (contact); and the cost of establishing and 
functioning of the governance structures dealing with resolving various disputes 
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(control) (Petrovic and Krstic, 2011). The dependent variable was thus constructed 
from contract agreement end point implementation outcome indicator result, 
measured in compliance rate (percent) on operation and maintenance of 
infrastructure and water supply services. 
 
The independent variables, included outcome indicator results derived from 
contact/coordination elements, such as presence or absence of water distribution 
calendar (dummy), clear existence of information sharing mode such as farmer to 
famer network, frequency of communication (numbers of meetings).  Other 
independent variables included the cost of functioning of governance (Control) 
variable outcome indicator, like number of sanctions implemented through formal 
and informal mechanisms (number of penalties) such as fines, court cases, and other 
punishments. Trend of number of farmer participants in different groups over time, 
market characteristics e.g. irrigation output market access-proxied by market 
distance (km) and quantity sold (kg), output prices, rainfall variation over time 
(measured in mm on annual backward looking trend), and presence of institutional 
support services (number/frequency of extension services), and periods (years) were 
also captured as independent variables.  
 
The analysis used panel data set. The panel data analysis is suitable in this setting 
because the interest is on describing changes over time.  Also, since observations on 
the same scheme (cluster) are likely to be similar than observation in other scheme, 
therefore, the analysis should take into account the intra cluster (intra scheme) 
correlation rather than assuming independence among all observations. Accordingly, 
panel data analysis technique was implemented to allow controlling for variables, 
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which cannot be observed or measured such as differences in practises or cultural 
factors across the scheme (individual/entity heterogeneity), and variables that change 
over time (Baltagi, 2012).  
 
Economists studying institutional aspects in irrigation systems (e.g. Mosha et al. 
2016) run into problem by using cross section design in which each individual 
(entity) provides different scales of response, rendering interpersonal or enter- entity 
responses meaningless, as opposed to the panel data where the metric used for 
individual entity is time invariant.  In this case, the time invariant accounts for any 
specific effects that are not included in the regression such as the unobservable 
entrepreneurial or management skills. Thus the use of panel analysis is best suited in 
this objective function.   
 
Various methods/ techniques of panel data analysis have been published (Wooldrige, 
2010; Baltagi, 2012).  Example of panel data analysis techniques include the fixed 
effect, random effect, mixed effect models and dynamic panel like Allellano and 
Bond panel analysis. Fixed effect and random effect linear models are basic 
technique frequently used in the panel data analysis. Fixed effects are designed to 
study causes of change within the individual or entity, while random effect studies 
across entities. The Fixed effect technique allows endogeneity of all the regressors 
with individual effects. In contrast, random effect assumes normal distribution and 
that the variations between entities are uncorrelated with the independent variables 
included in the model with the random individual effects. Mixed effect linear model 
is a combination of fixed effect and random effect model that permit random 
parameter variations to depend on observation (Baltagi, 2012).   
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As the aim is to study the impact/changes of intuitional quality within and across the 
schemes over time, thus mixed effect model technique was implemented in this 
analysis.  Mixed effect is particularly useful in this setting because it encompasses 
both fixed effect and random effect. The fixed effect such as the mechanism of 
governance (leadership style) and the random effect is the differences for the 
irrigation schemes (entity). 
Mathematically, the mixed effect model as specified by Cameron and Trivedi (2010) 
is represented as;  
itititiit uxXy   ............................................................................................(3) 
Where,  
               ity  the dependent variable for entity, i  and time, t  
               i  n-entity specific intercept (for long panel with few individuals can be 
parameters estimated by running separate regressions   
              itX = independent variable 
                 Parameter (coefficient) to be estimated    
                itu random effect slopes for the predictors 
               it  error term 
The model was estimated by maximum likelihood (ML) method using STATA 11 
 
 3.2.4.3 Objective three: Technical and Allocative efficiency 
Again, this objective was based on cross sectional data set aimed at assessing the 
effect of CA arrangement for shared irrigation resources utilization on farmers’ 
allocation of factors of production and technologies use/adoption. 
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Data were constructed and grouped into external and internal efficiency conditions in 
resource utilization.  The external efficiency conditions encompassed aspects, which 
reflect the congruency conditions of resource utilization efficiency. They included 
external efficiency; technology characteristics; and user behaviour motivation. These 
were then linked to data measuring internal efficiency (input –output relations) in a 
production frontier context that capture technical efficiency (TE) and allocative 
efficiency (AE). 
 
The external efficiency data were measured by constructing cropping intensity (CI) 
index (area sown over total area cultivated-ratio), management and leadership 
aspects in irrigation services provision (e.g. group leadership- dummy, good or 
otherwise) as a proxy indicator on use and access for irrigation facilities. Technology 
characteristics data were irrigation soil fertility status (dummy, good/fertile or 
otherwise), proximity/distance from homestead to the irrigation scheme (km), land 
owned in the irrigation command area (acres). Resource users’ behaviour motivation 
data included risk perception on the use of irrigation scheme (dummy, risk averse, or 
otherwise prefer). Other variables were constructed based on interactions between 
age and capital, and non-tangible benefits like use of CA as a bridge for external 
service support and income earning from irrigation farming.   
 
Other data included output and inputs (fertilizers) prices, and percent of time 
allocated for irrigation faming management (%). Transaction costs related data were 
grouped into information and knowledge (contact) such as number of meetings 
(frequency/number), irrigation training attendance (dummy, yes or otherwise), 
communication/travel cost in regard to irrigation issues (TZS). Demographic data 
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such as age (years), sex (dummy, male or otherwise) and education level (category) 
were also captured.   
 
The internal efficiency data were constructed based on input-output relations in a 
production function context to measure TE and AE scores.  Data set type required for 
TE and AE included harvested output/yield (kg), and inputs used such as fertilizers, 
labour all measured in quantities (kg or number), water allocation/distribution into 
plots/field (dummy, good or otherwise not). 
 
The analysis of this objective three involved two estimation techniques. First, TE 
was estimated using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) technique, which estimated 
the production function and TE inefficiency model in a single stage using Frontier 
4.1. The production function also produced the output elasticities, and the technical 
inefficiency effects (determinants of technical inefficiency). 
 
 Second, AE of factor inputs were computed based on coefficients generated by OLS 
estimation of Cobb Douglas production function. The two estimation techniques are 
mathematically formalized separately as follow: 
 
3.2.4.3.1 Allocative Efficiency (AE) 
 The AE modelling follows Essilfie et al. (2011) using Cobb-Douglas production 
functional form and is specified by 
n
ni
i
i XAXy

 …………………………………………………………………(4) 
Where, y  rice yield output (bags) 
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            ni XX ....  Inputs used (quantities measured in their respective units) 
          A   Constant 
        ni  ......  Parameters to be estimated 
 
Equation (4) can be written in its linear form for OLS estimation to compute the 
marginal value product (VMP) for each factor of production as in equation (5). 
The Cob-Douglas production function linear form is given by: 
i
n
i
iXAy   
1
lnlnln ……………………………………………….....(5) 
Where, 
       y Output 
       iX  Inputs 
       error term 
    ,A   are parameters to be estimated 
 
The VMP is defined from equation (5) above, using the coefficient estimates to 
generate marginal physical product (MPP) of the ith factor, it is written as: 
i
i
i
i
X
y
X
y
MP 


 ………………………………………………….......... (6) 
Where,  
y  is the geometric mean (mean of natural logarithm) of the output 
iX  Geometric mean (mean of natural log) of inputs, 
i is the estimated coefficients of inputs 
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Thus, the VMP of input is obtained by multiplying the MP  by the output price, yP .  
yi PMPVMP * …………………………………………………………….......(7) 
The allocative efficiency (AE) = 
xi
xi
MFC
VMP
……….............. (8) 
But farmers under imperfect markets are price takers, hence the marginal cost of 
inputs ( MFC ) approximates the price of the factor xiP .  The AE is therefore given 
by: 
AE= 
xi
ix
P
VMP
…………………………………………………………………......... (9) 
Three scenarios can be observed for decision of resource allocation as follows: 
If   1
xi
xi
MFC
VMP
 the input is under used 
If  1
xi
xi
MFC
VMP
  the input is over used, and  
If   1
xi
xi
MFC
VMP
 the input is efficiently allocated in the system 
 
3.2.4.3.2 Technical efficiency  
 To model TE the standard stochastic production frontier model is used. It is given 
by: 
))( )(
ii Uv
kii eXfY

  ……………………………………………………… (10) 
Where, iY = is the output of the i-th farm 
            iX = denotes a row vector of inputs used by the i-th farm 
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           )(k  = vector of unknown parameters to be estimated  
           iv = symmetric random error identically distributed as ),0(
2
vkN   
          ku = is a non-negative random variable assumed to account for technical 
inefficiency and assumed to be independently and identically distributed, and 
truncations at zero  of the normal distribution with mean )(ki  and variance  )
2
ku . 
The TE of i-th farm is then obtained by:  
)ii
I
k
i
u
VX
i
i e
e
Y
TE




…………………………………………….............. (11) 
Cobb-Douglas production functional form using MLE method was employed to 
estimate TE using Frontier 4.1.  
 
3.2.4.4 Objective Four:  Two Stage Least Square Method  
The fourth objective aimed at identifying how varying farm household objectives 
affect the extent of entrepreneurship of a household in enhancing CA coordination in 
irrigation systems. The data set consisted of farm household level information, which 
is cross sectional. These data were constructed to suit addressing the simultaneity 
bias of variables with an interdependence mechanism, where the independent 
variable- farming objective (commercial or subsistence)/treatment and the outcome 
of interest (dependent variable)- investment expenditures-a proxied as enterprising 
tendency, both are endogenous.  
 
Data type used for the structural equation dependent variable, investment 
expenditures (Inv) was indirectly measured as own annual/private total irrigation 
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expenditures /investment made in  the irrigation farming during the cropping period 
to account for real capital asset use (total cost in Tanzania shillings –logged to make 
normal distribution ), that was as a proxy for measuring the extent of  enterprising 
tendency. The independent variable- farm household objectives (FO), which is also 
endogenous in the structural equation, was measured as a dummy variable- whether 
the farmer is commercial/semi-commercial or subsistence oriented. Exogenous 
variables were identified and constructed to serve as instruments for 1X  (assumed to 
influence farmer objectives/ orientation, (FO)- these included output quantity 
marketed, proximity/distance to the irrigation schemes, output market distance (all 
measured in km), and transaction costs mainly contact costs measured in monetary 
value of contact/communication e.g. phone & travel costs (Tzs), and number 
(frequency) of meetings. Other instrumental variable data included were saccos 
service access (dummy), farming support services -which included extension service 
support (dummy), soil fertility status in the irrigation scheme (dummy), off farm 
activities engagement (dummy), household labor force availability (number of 
eligible member for farming), and irrigation type (dummy). The exogenous variables 
included in the structural equation were, sex (dummy), ownership of land within the 
irrigation scheme (dummy), group leadership style(dummy), non-tangible benefits 
like information sharing (categorical), trust (dummy), experience in irrigation 
farming (years),  contact/communication cost (Tanzania shillings/currency). 
 
To analyse the data, instrumental variable (IV) strategy was implemented. Different 
estimators such as Generalized Method of Moment (GMM), Limited Information 
Maximum Likelihood (LIML) and Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) exist in 
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estimating variables with endogeinety as described above (Verbeek, 2012). To 
control for the endogeneity problem, this study adopted a 2SLS because has 
advantage over other estimators described above in that it is computationally simple 
such that does not require the use of optimisation algorithms (i.e. can estimate 
parameters even if cannot be solved analytically from the first order conditions). It 
can also perform better under small sample (Verbeek, 2012), and it is efficient in the 
class of all IV estimators (Wooldrige, 2010). 
 
Mathematically, the 2SLS modelling proceeds in the following two steps:  
First, the structural equation is specified as: 
ii eXXY  21211110  ……………………………………………… (12) 
Where, iY endogenous outcome variable (log of total annual investment cost (Tzs) 
made in irrigation farming during the season  
            iXX 11 Independent variables which is endogenous- farm household 
objective (FO)- (dummy- 1= commercial or 0= subsistence oriented farmer) 
           2X  Independent variables which are exogenous (personal characteristics: 
age, sex, ownership of land in the irrigation scheme, trust, experience, group 
leadership style/discretion, and non-tangible benefits- measured as defined above.  
           ,21 , Parameters to be estimated      
           ie  error term which is assumed to be correlated with the endogenous 
variable 
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Second, some variable(s) Z  (instruments), which influence iX1 , but does not 
influence iY  are found. Correspondingly, the equation follows by including all 
exogenous variables from equation (i) above.  
It is written as: 
iii eXZX  23231201  ……………………………………………….(13) 
Equation (13) allows generation of new values/ predicted value for the variable
i
X

1 , 
such that 
The predicted value 
i
X

1  can now be substituted for iX1  in equation (12) above for 
estimation. 
Equation (12) is re- written as: 








iiii ueXXY 112121110 1  …………………………………….........(14) 
 Equation 14) was estimated using linear regression (OLS method) using STATA 
version 11 computer statistical program. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
4.1  Farm households, Irrigators Groups and Irrigation Systems 
Characteristics  
4.1.1  Households Characteristics 
Table 4.1 summarises farmers and households’ characteristics in the surveyed 
districts. The survey considered gender group categories, which covered both male 
household head (80.3%), and female household head (19.7%) responsible in the 
farming decision making. In terms of civil status, the sampled population showed 
that many individuals were married staying with their spouse (86.4%) and a few had 
their spouse away (3.8%). About 4.9 % were widow, and 2.7% were separated/ 
divorced, while a few were single (2.2%).  Many farmers involved in the survey had 
standard seven primary level of education (73.2%), and farming (37.6%) being the 
main household occupation to sustain their livelihood, and a few were engaged also 
on other off farm activities like running small non- agricultural business such as 
shops/kiosk (33.7%), and provision of casual labour for both on farm and non- farm 
activities such as masonry (11.6%), and other activities like livestock sales and 
fishing (7.7%).  
 
The average family size was 7.9 members composed of an average of 2 adult males, 
2 adult females, 3.2 children, and 0.86 old persons above 64 years.  The organisation 
of labour type used in irrigation farming was based on individual household labour 
supply on own farm/plot crop production, which was in three categories: family 
labour (68%), hired (22.9%), and exchange group labour (9%). Exchange group 
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labour is one where by farmers work in alternating pattern for each farmer field or 
any activity in the community in return for payment in kind- usually food a got or 
cattle is slaughtered for this function.  Family labour was mainly used at initial farm 
preparatory stage, and general farm management. Hired labour was used mostly at 
weeding stage, or harvesting and transportation. Exchange group labour was 
occasionally used especially where availability of family and hired labour is 
compromised and when one wishes to catch up the season because of un reliability of 
rainfall, which is a key determinant of irrigation operations/working.  All farmers in 
all irrigation schemes surveyed grown paddy/rice crop perhaps because of 
biophysical suitability or the importance of rice as food staple and cash earning crop.  
The farmers’ perception of soil fertility status for the plots in the scheme were –63% 
poor and 37% considered the soil fertility to be good. 
 
Table 4.1: Famer and Household Characteristics 
Variable Mean Percent 
Farmer Characteristics   
Age (years) 
Gender:  
Male 
Female  
Education level (years): 
Primary education 
Primary drop out 
Secondary education 
Secondary drop out  
Post-secondary/college/university  
No formal education 
44 
 
 
- 
- 
2.9 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
 
 
80.33 
19.67 
73.2 
12.02 
2.19 
2.73 
3.2 
6.56 
Household characteristics   
Family size (persons) 
Household member eligible for farming (persons) 
Household average annual income (off farm) Tzs 
Household with land ownership in irrigation command area (acres) 
Household hiring land (%) and average land (acres) hired in 
irrigation command area 
Percentage share of household income generating activities:  
Farming 
Non-agricultural business (small business) 
Casual labour supply 
Others (livestock sales and fishing)  
7.9 
3.9 
1 306 
689.4 
 
2.1 
 
0.7 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
88.7 
 
42.7 
 
37.6 
33.7 
11.6 
7.7 
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4.1.2 Irrigation System and Group Characteristics   
4.1.2.1 Irrigation Systems Characteristics 
Irrigation systems characteristics were more similar in all schemes surveyed.   Most 
irrigation systems were organised in such a way that farming was on individual 
household basis rather than share cropping (collective farming). Production cycle 
was seasonal mainly during rainy season with exception of irrigation scheme that 
abstracts water from Lake Victoria such as Nyatwali in Bunda district, which 
operates all year round for about 2-3 times production cycles per year.   
 
All irrigation schemes were traditional improved with farm structures not well 
mechanised to allow water use efficiency because canals were not or sometimes 
partly lined (cemented), having no weir structures to control flow and distribution of 
water on farm plots, and they all used flooding type approach for irrigation water 
distribution- the method which does not guarantee water use efficiency in relation to 
crop water requirement. The main sources of water for irrigation (catchment area) 
were rivers (73.4%), Lake Victoria (21.7%) and rain water harvest in some irrigation 
schemes with reservoirs/dams, like Maliwanda in Bunda, and cheleche and Irienyi 
schemes in Rorya districts (4.9%).  
 
The average irrigation schemes command area was 719 acres with a std of 684.6, 
implying that farmers had no wide variation of land in the irrigation schemes. The 
total area under cultivation in the irrigation scheme ranged from 100 acres to 1052 
acres with an average of 590 acres.  The irrigation groups consisted of an average 
total number of 285 members with a std of 69.1 farmers involved in the irrigation 
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farming. These members were chosen on the basis of possession of land or else 
hiring in the land within the schemes.  
 
Table 4.2: Irrigation Systems Characteristics 
Variable  Mean 
Average size of the scheme (acres) 
 
719 
 
Average area under irrigation farming (acres) 
 
590 
 
Sources of irrigation water for the irrigation schemes: 
 
Permanent river  
Lake 
Dam/reservoir     
 
Percent (%) 
 
73.4 
21.7 
4.9 
  
4.1.2.2 Irrigator Groups (Water users) Characteristics 
Irrigators groups also known as Irrigation water users Association (WUA) were 
found in each irrigation scheme to enable efficient exploitation of water resources in 
a sustainable and beneficial way for every member. Ideally, it was sought that each 
WUA must possess water right permit to have the right for water use and efficiency 
resource management. The water right permit is usually granted in a group basis by 
the water basin authority under the Ministry of water and Irrigation. The process of 
water right permit issuance is made easy through decentralized water basin offices 
available at zone levels in the country. In the Lake Zone it is referred to as the Lake 
Victoria water basin (LVB) covering the surveyed districts. 
 
 However, most of the groups visited in all irrigation schemes about 80% operated 
without water right permit (Table 4.1), while a few those with formal water right 
permit could not even pay the annual fee to the authority for reasons that the 
 74 
abstracted water does not justify fee payment because the authority itself does not 
have enough water for allocation in dry and rainy periods since all schemes rely on 
availability of rainfall -which is erratic, and do not have reservoir for irrigation water 
storage. In each scheme, there was one large farmer group consisting of an average 
of 285 members with their institutional arrangement and management. However, 
almost all groups were not formally registered.  
 
Table 4.3: Irrigator Groups Characteristics 
Variable Mean 
Average current number of irrigation water users per scheme 
 
 
 Irrigation group with water right permit  
 
285 
 
Percent (%) 
20 
Farmers perception on soil fertility status in irrigation scheme: 
-Good  
-Low /poor  
 
37 
67 
 
4.2  Impact of Irrigation Member Farmers’ Self-Selection Effects on CA  
Self-selection in this context refers to the tendency of farmers engaged in irrigation 
farming to make choices that are relevant to their preferences in respect to the 
farming system types- irrigation and rain fed, and the surrounding available 
livelihood opportunities. The choice is usually influenced by economic opportunities 
surrounding them based on observed and un observed (heterogeneity) characteristics. 
In this respect, specific identification of self-selection factors is crucial in 
understanding irrigation farmers’ behaviour and developing recruitment and 
retention strategies for irrigators CA members committed to work with greater 
impact in the irrigation systems.    
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A number of explanatory variables in an exclusion restriction (to avoid collinearity 
problem) were included in the regression model with sample selection to determine 
farmers’ behaviour, examine the effects/impact of self-selection on the choice of 
farming type and hence, implicitly reflect CA commitment. The null hypothesis that 
the decision for farmers to self-select into farming type does not base on TCs 
(contact, contract & control), economic opportunities in the area and perceptions of 
non-tangible benefits like socio network such as reciprocated information sharing 
was also tested. The summary descriptive statistics and definition of variables used 
in the Heckman selection model -two step regressions are presented in Table 4.4. 
  
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics and Definition of Variables used in Heckman 
Two Step Regressions  
Variable  Definition  Unit 
measure 
Mean  Std  
type1irrg irrigation farming ecosystem choice: 1= 
irrigation farming, 0= otherwise 
Dummy 0.917 0.28 
Totfarmlan Total farmland size owned (acres) Acres 2.53 2.46 
Age Age of respondent Years 44.09 12.00 
Sex 1=male, 0= female Dummy 0.803 0.39 
Hhlabor Number of members eligible for farming 
at household 
Number 3.93 2.23 
Educ Respondent’s education level 1= 
standard7, 2= secondary, 3= tertiary  
Categorical  2.95 1.01 
Trust Trust in group members regarding 
irrigation resources utilization: 1= yes, 0= 
no 
Dummy 0.95 0.19 
Irigntyp Irrigation type depended 1= modern, 0= 
traditional improved 
Dummy 0.16 0.37 
Farmsacspt Farmers financial support from saccos 
1=yes, 0=no 
Dummy 0.25 0.43 
Imprvseed Use of improved seed1= yes, o=no Dummy 0.73 0.44 
Soilirrgat Soil fertility status in irrigation farm land:  
1= fertile soils, 0= otherwise 
Dummy 0.37 0.48 
Totincome Total household income (Tanzania 
shilling) 
 Tanzania 
shilling 
(currency) 
1 804 523 165141
9 
Econoprtnit Recognize economic opportunities 
availability 1=yes, 0 otherwise 
Dummy 0.64 0.48 
Irrgreliab Irrigation farming reliability: 1= depend 
on, 0= no 
Dummy 0.73 0.45 
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Irgnetareason Irrigation net area sown: acres Acres 2.13 2.15 
nontangible Non tangible benefits: information 
sharing, 2=farmer to farmer 
helpfulness,3=producer marketing power, 
4= use of CA as bridge for external 
support  
Categorical 0.8 0.40 
Irrgdist Distance of irrigation scheme from the 
homestead: km 
Km 2.11 3.43 
Irrgtrain Irrigation technologies training 
acquisition: 1= yes, 0= no 
Dummy 0.75 0.43 
Irigposition Position/location of farmer plot in the 
irrigation scheme: 1=head, 2=middle, 
3=tail 
Categorical 2.12 0.66 
Factor1 Respect of public services provision 
/contributions: likert scale 
Likert scale 6.12 1 
Factor2 dodging contributions: likert scale Likert scale -2.43 1 
Factor3 Violation of rule: likert scale Likert scale 3.95 1 
Contrnmcst Contract agreement compliance measured  
in non-monetary cost contribution 
payment of rice bags after harvest:  
Number of 
rice bags 
3.97 5.46 
Gpleader Group leadership: 1= good/satisfactory,0= 
no/bad 
Dummy 0.65 0.47 
Rulework Working of rules and enforcement  1= 
good, 0 = bad 
Dummy 0.64 0.48 
 
Consistently, the Heckman two step sample selection regressions results are 
presented in Table 4.5.  The data set contains missing values therefore, observations 
with missing data were removed, and hence, only a sample of 67 observations 
remained for the econometric estimation.  The Wald chi square test for the model fit 
indicates significant differently from zero at less than 1% level (Chi-square 
probability = 0.000).  
 
Furthermore, the correlation factor (inverse mills ratio) result for the model is 
positive and significant at less than 5 % level (p=0.028) providing evidence for the 
presence of self-selection, hence suggesting that the irrigation farming ecosystem 
choice (type 1 farmer) is a non-random choice. The positive numerical value for the 
inverse mills ratio suggest that there are positive selection effects in these data and 
those who select into the irrigation farming rely most on the ecosystem than a 
 77 
random drawing from the population with comparable characteristics.  Therefore, the 
unobserved factors that make choice more likely tend to be associated with higher 
level of irrigation farming participation choice-implicitly CA commitment.   
 
On the basis of these results the null hypothesis was rejected in favour of the 
alternative, and concludes that farmers self-select into farming ecosystem types (type 
1 farmer) on the ground of TCs (contact, contract & control), and the site specific 
attributes of the TCs such as economic opportunities in the area and perceptions of 
non-tangible benefits like using CA as bridge for support services access which may 
increase or reduce the participation morale in the irrigation farming, besides 
unobserved characteristics not directly measured. Specifically, the first stage 
(outcome) regression results are informative in understanding the characteristics of 
individual farmers engaged in the irrigation farming (type1 farmer).  
 
Five factors (variables) were significant in explaining irrigation farming ecosystem 
choice. The variable age coefficient is negative and   significant at 10% level 
indicating that younger farmers are more likely to choose irrigation farming 
ecosystem type1 than would old farmers do.  
 
A one pecent (in year) increase in age of a farmer is likely to reduce participation in 
the irrigation farming choice by 0.5%, probably because younger farmers are 
energetic with less household responsibilities and also commercial oriented, so could 
afford complying with the CA social contract arrangements without dodging, since 
they value the resource for their livelihood development and sustenance.   
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The coefficient for the variable sex had a positive sign and significant at less than 1% 
level suggesting higher probability of men than women to participate in irrigation 
farming. Being a man farmer the likelihood of participation choice in the irrigation 
farming increases by 22% compared to the counterpart women farmers. A possible 
reasoning is probably due to the traditional and customary patterns in the African 
setting in general, and Tanzanian in particular -that men have higher influence on the 
access and control of resources and the responsibility to ensure household security. 
Men can also endure- in case of havoc arising for the irrigation facilities use amongst 
WUA members, besides having opportunities to attend various trainings than women 
would do.  
 
The coefficients for the variable education level (educ) categorised into:  primary 
level; secondary level; and tertiary (college and University) levels all had positive 
signs and significant at less than 1%; 5% and 10% respectively. These results suggest 
that education is an important determinant of farming ecosystem choice, with 
primary level individuals having higher likelihood of choosing and relying on type1 
farming ecosystem, followed by secondary level and lastly those with tertiary 
education level. The higher probability of choosing type 1 (irrigation farming 
ecosystem) for individuals with primary level of education is perhaps the fact that 
farming is their main occupation as opposed to the more educated individuals like 
those with secondary and tertiary levels who are more likely to seek and easily 
secure other formal employment /jobs elsewhere.  
 
The variable trust of individuals in irrigation group and leadership (trust) coefficient 
had a positive sign and significant at less than 1% level, suggesting that increase in 
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trustworthy is likely to increase choice and reliance of type 1 farming ecosystem.  
The reasoning is straight forward that farmers require exclusive rights and benefits 
realization on the use of resource without reasonable doubt arising from group or 
resource management.  
 
The coefficient for the variable soil fertility status in the irrigation command area 
(soilirrgat) had a positive sign and significant at less than 5% level. A one percent 
increase in soil fertility status in the irrigation scheme is likely to increase farmers’ 
participation choice by 11%. Soil fertility status is an asset specific attribute of TC in 
the form of site specific, which can increase or reduce TC. These results are not 
surprising; having fertile soils in the irrigation land increases the probability of 
farmers’ participation because farmers are sure of realizing higher yields and benefit 
from good soils, hence this calls for irrigation land improvement in order to reduce 
the transaction costs related to attrition, which had an implication on efforts exerted 
for the maintenance of infrastructures and contract compliance on operations and 
contributions. This point to the need of research and extension advisory services to 
enhance technologies and good agricultural practices applications. It can be through 
technologies development and training.  
 
The economic opportunities variable (econoprtnity) paints an interesting picture as 
an attribute that influence transaction cost in the farming ecosystem choice 
(irrigation participation and reliance). The coefficient is negative and not statistically 
significant. Though it is not statistically significant, in economics, results suggest 
that increasing availability of economic opportunities access in the area reduces the 
likelihood of farmers to participate in the irrigation farming, perhaps because they 
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can be engaged and earn their livelihood from other available wider economy stream 
sources. This has an implication on the importance of irrigation resource to the users. 
These results conform to the findings by Ostrom, (2010) that if the resource is not 
important to the users then the likelihood of managing it efficiently might be 
doomed.  
 
The variable related to SACCOS/financial support for farmers (farmsacsupt) 
coefficient had a positive sign and not statistically significant. Though it is not 
statistically significant the positive sign suggests that the irrigation farming 
ecosystem choice is likely influenced by existence of SACCOS/ financial support 
rendered to farmers to enhance capital investment. This is particularly important 
because irrigation farming requires capital investment to meet operations and 
maintenance aspects and other own production and marketing costs obligations. 
These results therefore point to the need of a clearly well managed finance-irrigation 
schemes linkage model to support farmers fully participation in the irrigation 
farming ecosystem.  
 
The sign for the variable irrigation type (irigtnype) defined as 1= modern and 0= 
tradition was negative and not significant. Despite the fact that irrigation type 
variable did not matter in influencing choice, the results suggest that farmers in 
tradition irrigation systems were less likely to choose and rely on irrigation farming 
ecosystem-implicitly were not likely to value the irrigation system, and consequently 
the CA, perhaps because of un reliability of the physical availability of water 
resources for most of irrigation schemes depending on rainfall, which is also erratic -
the situation that pre dispose farmers at production risks. These results point to the 
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need of improving irrigation schemes hardware to enhance efficient and reliable 
physical resource use.   
 
The coefficient for the variable improved seed use (imprvseed) is negative and not 
statistically significant. Though not statistically significant, the results highlight the 
effects in opposite direction on the choice of irrigation ecosystem. The possible 
explanations can be probably because improved seeds are not readily available in the 
formal seed system making it difficult and sceptical to rely on.  Other explanation 
can be because improved seeds require intensive inputs use and management, which 
is laborious, and require human skills, which farmers are lacking, hence adding up 
another transaction cost attributes.  
 
On the other hand, the requirement of reliable water for plot inlet and drainage at 
different stages of crop growth such as at planting stage, fertilizer application and 
harvesting to ensure good practices is labour and cash intensive. At the same time 
inputs are expensive that farmers cannot afford to comply with in a recommended 
packages and hence resulting into low returns compared with irrigation investment 
made, or it can be that improved seeds have no preferred traits for production, 
marketing and consumption.  
 
The coefficient for the variable total household income (totincome) had a positive 
sign and but not statistically significant. Although not statistically significant, the 
sign for the coefficient indicates that individual farmers with high total income were 
likely to choose for irrigation farming ecosystem.  A one percent increase in 
household total income were likely to choose participation in irrigation farming by 
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29.3%. These results are not surprising because irrigation farming requires intensive 
capital investment both cash and non-cash.  
 
The variable coefficient for total household farmland (totfarmland) is negative and 
not statistically significant.  However, though not statistically significant, results 
indicate that a one-percent increase of total farm land size in the irrigation scheme 
command area is likely to cause farmers not to choose the irrigation farming 
ecosystem participation by 0.7%, which is significantly low index of choice. The 
implication is that households with bigger total farmland were less likely to engage 
fully in the irrigation farming and hence collective activities commitment, perhaps 
because a bigger land ownership can be rented out to other farmers and in return earn 
the income at low transaction costs, i.e. without direct participation in the collective 
action activities. These results calls for equitable land allocations among farmers to 
ensure full participation and ownership of irrigation resources. 
 
 The selection regression results indicated that several factors are important 
determinants of farmers’ self-selection into farming types. The model fit and 
correlation factors results as described above have confirmed the presence of sample 
selection. The variable household labour (hhlabor) coefficient was positive and 
significant, suggesting that households with greater number of members eligible and 
engaged in farming self-select into the irrigation farming type, perhaps because they 
can have a freedom of labour division ‘’without compromising’’ to meet household’s 
tasks and compliance with CA social contractual arrangement as per irrigation group 
organisation requirement. Farmers can also self-select with respect to non-tangible 
benefits, which has options which included: farmer to farmer helpfulness (reciprocity 
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information/material sharing), and use of CA as a bridge to acquire external services 
support like research, extension advisory services, and business development.  
 
The sign for the coefficient of the variable non-tangible benefits (non tangible) 
particularly, the option for use of CA organisation as a link/bridge for external 
support was positive and statistically significant. A one percent increase of the use of 
CA organisation as a link for external support is likely to make farmers choose and 
exert effort in irrigation farming commitment by about 27%.  This can be particularly 
important for those farmers committed and strategically wish to receive external 
support services to boost their efforts for livelihood improvement. These findings 
point to the need of strengthening public private partnership model of collaboration 
that aim at enhancing support services, particularly focus on business development 
and chain wide collaboration.   
 
Working of rules variable in the irrigation group (ruleworkdumy) coefficient had a 
positive sign and statistically significant. The positive sign indicates that farmers 
evaluate the implementation and enforcement of rules in relation to their benefits 
would be realized in the irrigation systems. In this respect, farmers self-select on the 
basis of ‘’ perceived’’ good functioning of the rule, and hence irrigation ecosystem 
choice is, as a result observed. Therefore, the impact of this self-section might be 
compliance of irrigation contract arrangement because they respect the authority as a 
result of good rules and enforcement, hence abide by irrigation CA activities 
participation and contributions. Rules enforcement varies between groups and 
leadership styles across the irrigation schemes, and hence important aspects in 
explaining non-random choice depending on individual farmer’s preference and 
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attitude. These results point to the need of carefully screening/choice of group 
members and leaders those would implement and enforce the rules to the expectation 
of perceived good rule in the irrigation systems. The good rules and enforcement as 
perceived by farmers are characterised by fair consideration of resources distribution 
and accountability of coffers to the benefit of all members.   
 
The variable irrigation net area sown (irignetarea) is also an important determinant 
for self-selection. The coefficient is negative and significant at less than 5% level.  A 
one percent increase of acreage net area planted crops in the irrigation plot is likely 
to cause a huge negative impact of about 54. 3% reduced effort exertion for irrigation 
collective activities. The implication is that farmer self-select based on the net 
irrigation area sown crops such that farmers with large net area sown do not value 
participation on irrigation farming, which explicitly indicates less commitment on 
CA social contract agreements.  
 
As such irrigation farming ecosystem (type 1) is not observed. This is not queer 
because farmers are rational and thus evaluate implicitly the cost-benefits of CA 
participation, and perhaps availability of household labour force as compared to 
other available economic opportunities with respect to transaction costs involved.  In 
other words, the impact for this self-selection might be associated with low 
morale/motivation to choose for the type1- irrigation farming ecosystem in that 
regard. These findings therefore call for equitable distributions and allocation of 
tasks requiring CA in the irrigation schemes depending on individual farmer’s area 
sown crops rather than equal CA work distribution.  
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Trust variable (trust) in group members and leaders had a coefficient with positive 
sign and statistically significant. Results indicated that irrigation farming ecosystem 
choice was observed on the ground of trust.  A one percent increase in trust among 
members and leaders in the irrigation collective action is likely to influence self-
selection into irrigation participation by 31.3%. Trust plays an important role in 
social interactions, particularly in enhancing the provision of public good services.  
 
These findings are similar to other studies like Kreps, (1990), and Sene, (2012), 
which also indicated that trust reduces TCs, and predict/ encourage participation in 
local public goods production. The impact of this self-selection might be 
encouragement of individual farmer who chooses irrigation ecosystem type 1 to 
cooperate in a voluntary way for the activities in the public goods provision such as 
in irrigation schemes, reduce free riding, and hence respect of the law in the CA. 
However, because trust manifestation for an individual is not easy to predict /show, 
this points to the need of devising fair mechanisms for resources distribution and 
accountability, which might be used as proxy indicator for trust.  
 
On the other hand, farmers also self-select into irrigation farming type on the ground 
of irrigation position of plots in the irrigation schemes, which were based on options 
of: head ender, middle and tail ender. The coefficient for the variable irrigation 
position (irigposition) tail ender option is negative and significant at less than 5% 
level. A one-percent increase of the distance in the irrigation position towards tail 
end reduces observation participation of irrigation farming choice by 23.7%.  
Farmers are less likely to choose irrigation farming ecosystem when they are 
positioned at the end part from the head part source of water. This is perhaps because 
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of the fact that being at the end part from water source pre dispose one at lower 
chance of having sufficient water required for the crops- more especially in a poor 
water management and control, hence irrigation farming choice is not observed for 
the tail enders. The impact for this might be free riding, dodging contributions and 
violation of rules set forth. This calls for fair resource distribution amongst WUA 
members.  Other options for the variables of head ender and middle had coefficients 
with positive sign and insignificant. 
 
The variables related to attitudinal behavioural factors- computed in a factor 
reduction analysis approach with options, which included: respect of public services 
provision in form of frequency contributions (Factor1); dodging contributions 
(Factor2); and violation of rules (Factor 3) were important determinants for farmer 
self-selection into farming types.  
 
The variable respect of public services contributions (Factor1) coefficient had 
positive sign and significant at less than 5% level. Attitude related to frequent 
contributions and respect of public service provision is relevant for commitment in 
the irrigation farming ecosystem under CA. Amongst CA members, a one percent 
increase in the behaviour of respect and compliance on contributions set is likely to 
cause self-selection into the irrigation farming choice by 14.8%.  The impact of this 
self-selection is relevant for retaining CA members committed to participate in the 
irrigation farming ecosystem- type1.   
 
Self-selection with respect to dodging contributions (Factor2) is equivalent to free 
riding and opportunistic behaviour. Free riding is maximization of own welfare 
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without compensation of others’ efforts such as dodging contributions to these 
efforts, whereas opportunistic behaviour occurs when actors deliberately take 
advantage of the situation in pursuit of self-interest at the expense of others, which 
can be cheating or hide of relevant information. Farmers with non-commitment 
behaviour or those worry contributions because of mismanagement albeit relying on 
irrigation farming ecosystem might self-select into type. A one percent increase in 
dodging contribution is likely to influence self-selection into irrigation farming by 
8.2%. The impact of this self-selection is important for CA members’ recruitment 
and understanding contributions/ compliance rate. It is also important in developing 
mechanisms for control, which are enforceable with less cost.  
 
The coefficient of the variable violation of rules (Factor 3) is negative and 
significant at less than 5% level. A one percent increase in the violation rules reduces 
the likely that farmers will self-select into irrigation farming by 29.1%. The 
implication is that an increase of farmers with attitude towards violation of rules such 
as diversion of irrigation water and other disobedience of laws/bylaws are likely to 
discourage other innocent farmers from fully participation in the irrigation farming.  
Other variables, like compliance on the contract for contribution payments in kind 
(contrnmcst) and irrigation technologies training (irrgtrain) were not statistically 
significant, but indicated positive effects towards self-selection into treatment (type 1 
farming ecosystem). 
 
The study concludes that irrigation farming ecosystem choice (type 1 farmer) is a 
non-random choice, and hence selection of members for organised CA establishment 
should base on factors such as families with greater number of members eligible and 
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engaged in farming at household much as market for labour is imperfect; non 
tangible benefits, particularly using organised CA as a bridge (network) to help 
farmers get support from various external service providers in implementing 
sustainable farming practises and take part in post- harvest agribusiness activities 
downstream in a value chain management perspectives;  good working of rules in the 
irrigation group; and   stimulate attitude related to frequent contributions and respect 
of law on  public service provision through good leadership and rules enforcement  
because  were found to be positive and significantly influenced self-selection into 
treatment.  
 
On the other hand, factors which impose negative effects/challenges that discourage 
farmers from fully exerting commitment effort contributions in the irrigation farming 
ecosystem were: dodging contributions (factor2), and violation of rules/ bylaws 
(Factor3), which were also relevant for farmers’ self-selection. These factors should 
be accounted for because their impacts are important for understanding CA 
members’ incomes ability and motivation, recruitment strategy for public services 
provision, and development of less costly control mechanisms. They are also 
important in understanding setting up contribution level/amount affordable by all 
members through public-private partnership involvement to enhance compliance 
rate.  
 
Overall, the major contributions of this study in the existing empirical literature are 
twofold: First, the use of novel approach of Heckman selection model in addressing 
the problem of collective action establishment and survival of collective action for 
irrigation systems performance, and other emerging economic development efforts 
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involving the commons and public service provision. This approach has not been 
applied in the irrigation systems context to my understanding. Second, the use of 
irrigation systems management data by farmers under CA is also relevant for the 
empirical evidence in Tanzania and other developing countries, since the use of 
groups (WUA) by many authors and practitioners is generally considered a strategy 
to efficient irrigation performance (NIPO, 2009), which is not the case because their 
establishment does not account for self-selection effects amongst members. The 
present study concludes that selection of group members for a successful CA to 
enhance irrigation performance should base on non-random recruitment based on self 
–selection factors described above.     
  
Table 4.5: Heckman Two Step Selection Model Regression Analysis Estimates 
Variable  Coefficient  SE Z value 
type1irrg    
Totfarmland -0.0069 0.0159 -0.43 
Age -0.0049 0.0029 -1.68*** 
Sex   0.2223 0.0766 2.90* 
Hhlabor 0.0082 0.0131 0.63 
Educ: primary 
           Secondary 
           College 
0.2254 
0.3945 
0.2459 
0.0815 
0.1822 
0.1313 
2,76* 
2.17** 
1.87*** 
Trust 1.2542 0.2154 5.82* 
Irigntyp -0.1711 0.1607 -1.06 
Farmsacspt 0.0955 0.9525 1.00 
Imprvseed -0.1277 0.1368 -0.93 
Soilirrgat 0.1103 0.0550 2.00** 
Totincome 2.93 2.65 1.10 
Econoprtnity -0.0487 0.0884 -0.55 
Const -0.4365 0.2358 -1.85*** 
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Irrgreliab 
Irgnetareason -0.5426 0.2449 -2.21** 
nontangble: information sharing 
use of CA as bridge  
 
-1.2407 
2.7261 
 
6.5486 
1.1415 
 
-0.19 
2.39* 
Hhlabor 0.3463 0.2087 1.66*** 
Trust 3.1257 1.687 1.85*** 
Irrgdist 0.0173 0.2105 0.08 
Irrgtrain 1.0182 0.9972 1.02 
Irigposition: headender 
middle  
tailender 
- 
0.0527 
-2.3710 
- 
- 
0.8032 
1.0495 
- 
- 
0.07 
-2.26** 
- 
Factor1 1.4812 0.6924 2.14** 
Factor2 0.8233 0.4260 1.93*** 
Factor3 -2.9112 0.9641 -3.02* 
Contrnmcst 0.0226 0.0506 0.45 
Gpleader -0.0131 0.0094 -1.4 
Ruleworkdumy 1.7707 0.8322 2.13** 
Totincome -2.56 3.71 -0.69 
Lamda 0.1613 0.7361 2.19** 
Constant -3.1527 2.2699 -1.39 
Wald Chi
2
:  84.87 
Prob> Chi
2
: 0.0000 
N: 67 
Notes: Significance levels: * = p<1%, ** = p<5%, and ***= p<10%  
 
4.3  Factors Influencing Institution Quality of CA in the Irrigation Systems 
This section presents results for the analysis of objective two, which aimed at 
identifying the determinants of institution quality changes over time in the irrigation 
systems under CA organisation setting. Table 4.6 presents descriptive statistics and 
definition of variables used for the mixed effect model. From the table, the between 
std statistics for the dependent variable (compliance) is bigger than the within 
 91 
implying that the variations of (compliance) institutional quality is bigger between 
the schemes.  
 
Table 4.6: Summary Statistics and Definition of Variables used in the Mixed 
Effect Model Regression 
Variable   Definition  Unit 
measure 
Mean Std 
Overall between Within 
Dependent        
Compliance  Institutional quality 
of CA 
Number of 
farmers 
turning up 
(comply) over 
the years   
166.02   94.0 
 
94.93 31.61 
 
Independent  
      
Watercalendar Presence of water 
distribution 
arrangement 
calendar 
Dummy 
(1=yes,  
0= no) 
0.37      0.5    
    
0.45 0.25 
infosharemode Information sharing 
mode like farmer to 
farmer network 
Dummy 
(1=yes,  
0= no) 
0.85    0.4  
 
0.37 0.00 
 Meeting Number of meetings 
held pertaining to 
irrigation collective 
action issues 
annually/seasonally 
Number 2.5      1.6 
 
1.19 1.09 
Extsuport Extension advisory 
services support 
frequency offered to 
farmers 
Number 14.13    31.9    
 
32.98 8.32 
controlguard Presence of control 
guard in the 
irrigation scheme 
Dummy 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.44      0.5 
 
0.52 0.11 
Monitoringhrs Hous spend on 
monitoring the 
irrigation scheme  
Hours  13.04    18.3    
  
17.5 8.4 
formalpenalt Control mechanism 
implemented to 
constrain adverse 
human behaviour 
through  court cases 
and formal charges 
prosecution within 
the village  
Number of 
penalties  
0.06      0.3   
 
0.07 0.27 
Infopenalt Control mechanism 
implemented 
informally  through 
sanctions or self-
enforcing to restrain  
Number of 
penalties 
1.73    3.32 
  
3.11 1.61 
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adverse human 
behaviour in the 
irrigation scheme  
Qtysol Output quantity sold 
as a proxy for 
market access and 
product demand at 
scheme level 
Bags 1095.1
4 
  1376.    
 
1227.61 763.78 
Mktdist Proximity to the 
output market 
distance as a proxy 
for market access 
Km 6.94 17.3       
 
7.8 0.18 
Outputprice Output price per unit 
(bag) 
TZS 55945     
18721.8    
  
12255.3 14829.2 
Timet Time period for 
event occurrence 
Years 2007.5    2.89    
 
0 2.89 
rainfall Rainfall amount over 
years 
Mm 63.75       
25.64  
 
0 2.5.64 
infpenty*time Interaction between 
informal penalty and 
time 
Number 3471     
6669.5   
  
6251 3239.9 
Exttime Interaction between 
extension advisory 
service and time 
Number 28384.
9 
    
63995.5     
 
6623.3 16759.9 
Quantprice Interaction between 
quantity sold and 
output price 
Number 7.49e+
07 
    
1.10e+0
8    
 
9.25e+07 6.8e+07 
Raintime Interaction between 
rainfall and time 
Number 127950  51459.8 
 
0 51459.8 
 
Several field studies on common resources management indicate that successful 
communities in resource management under CA typically exhibit well defined rules, 
the ability to monitor resource extraction and punish deviators, have existence of 
mechanisms for conflict resolution and a forum for discussion (Bandiera et al. 2005).  
At the same time scholars, (Gibbon and Robert, 2013) agree that good organisation 
appears together with institutional features. In this regard, the ability to cooperate in 
a collective action particularly, in the irrigation systems (common resource) is a key 
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determinant for efficient economic performance due to institutional quality. Yet, 
there is little evidence of how governance mechanisms such as contact and control, 
and external factors like market characteristics and rainfall variability affect 
institutional quality of CA in the irrigation schemes (Andrew et al. 2015). This 
shortcoming is analysed in this section using panel data set related to ex-post 
transaction costs (contract compliance, control and contact outcomes) as well as 
market characteristics, and rainfall variability. The analysis tested the null hypothesis 
that transaction costs, market factors and rainfall characteristics do not influence 
institutional quality in irrigation group members.  
 
The mixed effect linear regression results with random intercepts are reported in 
Table 4.7. The null hypothesis was rejected (p= 0.0000) and concluded that output 
market factors (output prices, market distance, and quantity sold as a proxy of market 
access), rainfall variability characteristics and transaction costs do matter in the 
institutional quality (compliance) influence in the irrigation systems.  
 
The full mixed effect model likelihood ratio (LR) test results indicated that the 
random coefficients between and the fixed effect within irrigation schemes have 
statistically significant variation (p= 0.017). Taking the estimated results for the 
overall intercept- for both fixed and random effects of 54.99 percentage points as a 
baseline (reference), the findings showed that the institutional quality (compliance) 
may vary (increase or decrease) by a standard deviation of 18.19 across the schemes 
(Table 4.7).  Consistently, six variables were important determinants of (compliance) 
institutional quality within and across the irrigation schemes.  
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The coefficient for the variable information sharing (infosharemode) among farmers 
within and between irrigation schemes had a positive sign and significant at less than 
1% level.  As time goes on, for every increase of information sharing strategy by 1 
percentage point the institutional quality level increases by 216%.  This is expected 
because information is power and enables farmers to learn and obtain technical 
knowledge, technologies and market information easily and at less cost through 
interaction networking amongst farmers. The implication is perhaps that as time 
passes by then farmer to farmer network relations is strengthened because of frequent 
interaction and hence reduced TCs. Other studies on transaction cost have also 
confirmed the reduction of transaction costs due to frequent interaction 
(Groenewegen et al, 2010). 
 
The coefficient for the variable related to formal penalty (formapenalt) had a 
positive sign and significant at less than 1% level. Implementation of formal penalty 
such as court cases and or taking culprits to the village executives influenced 
compliance. An increase of one percent level formal penalty influence compliance by 
20%, implying that farmers respect or fear most the formal procedures like court 
cases.  
 
On the other hand, the coefficient for informal penalt (infopenalt) was negative and 
significant at less than 5% level, implying reduction of institution quality as time 
passes by, perhaps informal rules implementation is biased amongst farmers as time 
of interactions among farmers’ increases. Frequent interactions create closeness 
relations and sometimes friendships, which may cause biased rules enforcement and 
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implementation. Other studies have established that a combination of formal and 
informal rules provide good results on institution efficiency (Moshi et al, 2016).  
 
The coefficient for the market characteristics variable such as quantity sold (qtysold) 
was positive and significant at less than 10% level. This is obvious because as output 
quantity increases implies that the produced products have demand and farmers have 
market access. A one percent increase in the rice quantity sold increases the 
institution quality by 2.3%. At the same time, the coefficient for market distance 
(mktdist) was negative and significant at less than 10% level. These results imply 
that when market distances increases by one percent the institutional quality declined 
by 59.8 % over time. Market distance has big impact over institution quality 
improvement because producers need benefit out of the produced outputs and hence 
these results point to the need of market access improvement. 
  
The coefficient for the interaction variable (infopenalt*time) had a positive sign and 
significant at less than 5% level. The result indicates that there is positive correlation 
between informal penalty and time. As time goes on, informal penalty improves the 
institutional quality level. A one percent increase in informal penalty implementation 
over time improves institution quality by 95.7%. This is perhaps because of frequent 
interaction or due to “tit for tat” (Binmore, 2007), and hence trust among them is 
built. 
 
Other variables were not significant. The coefficient for the variable frequency of 
meetings (meeting) attended regarding irrigation farming issues had a positive sign 
and not significant. Though not significant, results indicate that a one percent 
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increase in frequency of meetings increases institution quality/compliance by 16.9%.  
A plausible explanation can be that attending meetings enhances information and 
communication such that farmers internalize the institutions for compliance. 
Meetings are the transaction cost related to contact and coordination to enhance 
efficiency economic activity implementation.  
 
The coefficient for the variable presence of control guard for the resource boundary 
(controlguard) was positive and not significant. Though not significant the positive 
sign indicates a positive effect on enhancing institution quality. A one percent 
increase of the presence of control guard to monitor the scheme boundaries increases 
compliance /institutional quality by 178.9% within the scheme. Thus irrigation 
schemes with control guard had intuitional quality (compliance) higher than ones 
without guards. However, increasing presence of control guard is costly, hence less 
cost based mechnisim has to be devised to ensure institution quality. This can be 
through institutional arrangement such that there is self enforcing by cultivating trust 
amongst farmers through good leadership and accountability. This result conforms to 
Ostrom’s (2010) institutional design principle that clearly defined boundaries of 
resource appropriators is a pre-condition for a successful common resource 
management. Thus defining resource boundaries and ensuring control guard rather 
than focusing exclusively on physical characteristics of the resource may enhance 
institutional quality.  
 
Other variables included in the model such as presence of water distribution calendar 
(watercalender) had coefficient with negative sign showing a regative relationship 
effect on the institutional quality. Though not statistically significant, a one percent 
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increase in the water distribution calendar organisation reduces the institutional 
quality by 159.6%.  This is perhaps because of biasedness in water allocation and 
distribution among farmers, or inadequate water allocated such that farmers disobey 
the calendar of distribution arrangement. This calls for improvement on the 
administrative strategy employed on water management and control.  
 
The coefficient of the variable extension service support (extsuppot) was also 
positive and non-significant. Though not statistically significant, the coefficient had 
positive effect on institutional quality such that a one percent increase in the 
frequency of extension advisory service support increases institutional quality by 
1657.9%. within the scheme.  Extension service support is an asset specific attribute 
of transaction cost that influence human capital development, and hence reduce 
farming management TCs related to sysnthesis of information and bounded 
rationality on negotions with regard to irrigation resource utilization. 
 
The coefficient for the variable related rainfall (rainfall) had a negative sign and not 
significant. Though not significant it had greater effect on institutional quality. A one 
percent increase in rainfall- mm, reduces the institution quality by 1085%. This is 
obvious, because under high rainfall farmers have no need of water for irrigation 
hence reduces compliances/ institutional quality.   
 
The time trend/treatment effect coefficient (timet) was negative and non-significant, 
though not significant indicates that the institutional quality reduces over time. The 
reduction of institutional quality (compliance) is probably due to rainfall variability 
which directly affect negatively water availability in the irrigation schemes, hence 
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farmers decide to violate rules because of self-interest behaviour and survival for the 
fittest.  
 
The coefficient for the interaction variable between quantity sold and price 
(qnty*price) was negative and not significant. A one percent increase in quantity 
sold and prices go down or vice versa reduces the institution quality greatly by 
145%. The results indicate negative correlation between quantity sold and prices as 
quantity increases the prices go down and vice versa, hence institutional quality 
reduces, implying that commodity price is important in leveraging institutional 
quality and compliance stability.   
 
Similarly, the output price coefficient (outputprice) is positive and non-significant, 
but the sign indicates that output price contributes positively on institution quality 
increase. Other variables included like monitoring hours for the irrigation scheme 
(monitoringhrs) and the interaction between monitoring hours and informal penalty 
(monhrs*infopenalt) were positive and non-significant. The results indicate positive 
relations, as monitoring hours for the irrigation scheme increases, informal penalty 
increases and so does the institution quality level improves over time. This is perhaps 
defaulters are easily identified in this guard monitoring mechanisms. However, there 
is an inevitable costs increase in terms of personel hours to ensure the institutions are 
manintained. So the TCs for the irrigation systems management are high.  
 
On the other hand, the interaction between extension support and time (extsup*time) 
coefficients was negative and non-significant, indicating negative correlation. As 
time goes on extension services support reduces, and hence institutional quality. The 
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reduction of extension services support is perhaps because extension advisory service 
provided does not meet the farmers need.  It might be that extension services are 
biased provided amongst farmers or else sometimes farmers do not respect the 
extension agent because of frequent interaction and monotonic extension advise 
delivery mode.  
         
Table 4.7: Mixed Effect Linear Model Regression Results 
Variable  Coefficient SE Z value 
 
Individual level fixed effect  
Watercalendar -15.9567 16.09 -0.99 
Infosharemode 216.1934 69.04 3.13* 
Meeting     0.1693   4.13 0.04 
Extsuport 165.7959 111.79 1.48 
Controlguard 17.8872 40.06 0.45 
Monitoringhrs   0.0992    0.47 0.21 
Formalpenalt 20.1430 12.20 1.65*** 
Infopenalt -1931.07 976.04 -1.98** 
Qtysold 0.02259 0.013 1.81*** 
Mktdist -5.9804 3.48 -1.71*** 
Outputprice 0.00067 0.0005 1.42 
Timet -2.0537 3.65 -0.56 
infpenty*time  0.9571 0.48 1.97** 
monhrs*infopenty  0.8063 0.62 1.31 
ext*time -0.0830 0.06 -1.49 
quanty*price -1.45e-07 1.81e-07 -0.80 
rain*time 0.0539 0.051 1.04 
Rainfall -108.515 103.71 -1.05 
Constant 4125.804   
 
Random effect intercepts 
 
Estimate 
 
SE 
 
p (LR) 
Standard deviation  54.99 18.19 0.0017 
N= 70 
n of groups= 7 
Log likelihood=-337.965 
Prob> chi2 =  0.0000 
 
Note: Significance levels: * = p<1%, ** = p<5%, and ***= p<10%  
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Another reasoning might be because of the government’s budgetary disbursement 
constraints that directly affect extension services working environment. The budget 
has not been always reaching to 100% when compared to the approved against actual 
expenditures, although the allocation trend has increased in nominal terms since 
2003/2004 fiscal year (Gabagambi, 2013).   
 
4.4  Productivity, Technical Efficiency and Factor Inputs Allocation in 
Irrigation Systems  
4.4.1  Overview  
This section reports the results of productivity and efficiency parameters (technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency) to answer objective three, which aimed at 
assessing the effect of collective action (CA) on technical efficiency, and allocative 
efficiency. The hypothesis that collective action does not affect farmers’ technical 
efficiency and allocation of production factors in the irrigation scheme was rejected. 
 
The section therefore outlines the productivity parameters measurement of the 
production function in two scenarios: first, reports the parameters such as output 
elasticity, technical efficiency and determinants of inefficiency. Second, presents the 
scores for the allocative efficiency to explain whether production factors (resources) 
are optimally, under or over allocated by farmers in the irrigation systems under CA 
management.  
 
4.4.2 Production Frontier, Output Elasticities and Technical Efficiency  
This section presents the productivity and efficiency parameters estimated using 
stochastic frontier analysis for the translog production function, which was estimated 
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by MLE method, and the allocative efficiency for the factor inputs allocation in the 
irrigation systems estimated by ordinary least square for the Cobb Douglas 
production function.  
 
4.4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics and Definition of Variables used for the Production 
Function 
Table 4.8 provides definition and summary statistics for the variables used for the 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) of the production function and technical efficiency 
estimations. The table indicates that the average yield produced by farmers was 39.8 
bags per hectare. The bag weighed an equivalent of an average of 90kg paddy rice. 
The average seed amount used in the production of rice was 16.4 kg per ha, with big 
variations ranging from 5kg to 60 kg. The average amount for the fertilizers normally 
used by farmers was 199 kg per ha, also far below recommendations (ibid), and 
average number of days used to work on irrigation farming were 153 person days, 
with a wide variation ranging from 1 to 1003 person days per ha. The working days 
include all full range of activities from farming to pre and post-harvest management 
such as harvesting, transportation, threshing, drying, packaging and so on. Other 
inputs used were capital investment, which were directly used in irrigation farming 
such as labour costs with an average amounting to 5 014 Tanzania shillings, though 
there were a wide variation ranging from 2 400 to 3 050 500 Tanzania shillings. The 
strategy for water distribution in the plots/field was rated for satisfaction (good, fair 
or unfair) as inputs to satisfy crop-water requirement for the cropping period, which 
averaged to 1.8. Other variables included in the model of technical inefficiency 
effects are shown in Table 4.8 along with their summary statistics.  
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Table 4.8: Definition of Variables used in the SFA for the Production Function 
and Technical Inefficiency Model 
Variable 
 
Description Measure  Mean  Std  Min  Max  
Output: 
Yield 
 
Rice yield harvested 
per ha 
 
Bags** 
 
39.8 
 
78.1 
 
1 
 
864 
Inputs: 
Inputseed Seed amount used per 
ha 
kg 16.4 8.8 5 60 
Inputfert Fertilizer amount used 
per ha 
kg 199.5 1006 25 1000 
Labour Number of days 
worked per ha 
Person 
day 
153.2 738 1 1003 
Capitalinv Cash investment cost TZS 501434 39712
3 
240
0 
30505
0 
Water 
distribution 
Satisfaction of water 
distribution  in plots 
as inputs  
categor 1.8 0.63 1 4 
Variables affecting deviation of output from frontier: 
 
Sex Sex of farmer decision 
maker in farming 
Dummy 0.8 0.39 0 1 
Age 
 
Age of farmer(years) Years 44.09 12 17 80 
Educ Education level of 
farmer 
Categor
y 
2.9 1.01 1 7 
Irrgland  Irrigation land owned 
in the scheme 
Acres 2.1 2.06 0.2 20 
Irrigdist Distance from home 
to the irrigation 
scheme 
Km 2.1 3.2 0.2 42 
Irrgtrain Acquisition of 
irrigation technology 
training 
Dummy 0.75 0.43 0 1 
Gpleader CA group leadership 
style in the scheme 
(1=good,0=bad) 
Dummy 0.65 0.47 0 1 
Nofmeeting Frequency of 
meetings related to 
irrigation issues  per 
cropping period  
Number 10.8 15.3 0 52 
Expirrig Experience in 
irrigation farming 
Years 8.8 5.3 1 29 
Soilirrgat Soil status/fertility in 
the scheme(1=good, 
0=otherwise) 
Dummy 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Riskpercept Risk perception on the 
irrigation 
Dummy 0.64 0.71 0 1 
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technology/resource 
use(1=high risk, 0= no 
risk) 
Price/kg Output price per unit 
kg 
Kg 1017 1028 0 833.33 
LN-age*capital Interaction effect 
between age and 
capital(years*income-
TZS) 
Number 1.9* 1.7* 0 9.5* 
LN-
NTB*incomeirr
g 
Interaction effect 
between non tangible 
benefits like use of 
CA for external 
support access and 
income (dummy* 
income-TZS) 
Number 264499
1 
1.7* 0 1.8* 
LN-contactcost Contact/communicati
on cost such as 
phones and travel cost 
TZS 5772 30950 0 30500
0 
LN-CI Index of cropping 
intensity as a proxy of  
good governance in 
the irrigation system 
Index 
number 
0.948 0.219 0 2 
Prcfym Cost of manure input 
(FYM)  
TZS 2771.7 15183 0 12000
0 
Prcdap Cost of fertilizer input 
(DAP) 
TZS 24016 35686 0 20000
0 
Prcurea  Cost of fertilize 
(UREA) 
TZS 28159 33642 0 10000
0 
Prctsp Cost of fertilizer 
(TSP) 
TZS 492.3 6634 0 90000 
Prcminjingu Cost of fertilizer 
(Minjingu) 
TZS 540.8 4104 0 40000  
%totirgmgt Percent total time 
devoted for irrigation 
farm management 
Percent 70.6 37.5 0 180 
Note: **a bag of paddy is equivalent to an estimated 90 kg weight; *=times 10
7 
 
 
4.4.2.2 Production Function Estimation Results for the Production Frontier 
Technical Efficiency, Output Elasticity and Technical Inefficiency 
Effects  
The maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of the parameters of the stochastic 
frontier production function and the technical inefficiency model were 
simultaneously estimated in a single stage using Frontier 4.1 statistical package 
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(Battes and Coelli, 1995). Table 9 reports the statistical tests to confirm the 
appropriateness of SFA in the frontier production function.  Kumbhakar and Lovell 
(2000) explain the variation of outputs from the frontier attributed by the technical 
inefficiency that it ranges between 0 and 1.  If gamma, 0  implies that there is no 
inefficiency in the model and the traditional average response function can be 
estimated by OLS method.  The results in Table 9 for this thesis indicate that the 
variance parameter gamma is close to one ( )99680.0(  and significant at 1% level, 
implying that the inefficiency effects are likely to be significantly high in the 
analysis of the output (yields) for the sampled farmers in the irrigation system. In 
other word, 99.6% of the inefficiency is due to technical inefficiency and only 0.4% 
due to random error.  The generalized likelihood ratio test is significant at 1% level, 
rejecting the null hypothesis that inefficiency effects are absent, or that they have 
simpler distributions.  
 
Table 4 9: MLE Estimates for the Production Function Frontier and Technical 
Inefficiency Model 
Variable Coefficient SE t- statistic 
Production frontier    
Constant  0.5444 0.3540 15.37 
Inputseed -0.5287 0.1938 -27.28* 
Inputfert -0.2163 0.1214 -17.80* 
Labour 0.1003 0.9290 108.06* 
Capitalinv 0.7604 0.2582 0.29 
Water distribution 0.9844 0.3816 0.25 
Technical inefficiency 
model 
   
Constant -0.1370 0.2552 -0.54 
Sex 0.5546  0.3941 14.07 
Age 
Educ 
0.2209 
-0.3824 
0.5519 
0.5923 
0.40 
-0.64 
Irrgland  -0.1943 0.3057 -63.54* 
Irrigdist -0.3752 0.2581 -14.53 
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Irrgtrain 0.1224 0.6115 20.02** 
Gpleader -0.4166 0.4673 -89.15* 
nof meeting 0.4073 0.1426 28.55* 
Expirrig 0.1110 0.2475 0.44 
Soilirrgat 0.3918 0.3885 10.08* 
Riskpercept 0.6245 0.9532 0.65 
Price/kg -0.1497 0.9010 -16.61* 
LN-age*capital 0.1188 0.3294 36.06* 
LN-NTB*incomeirrg -0.7073 0.2497 -28.32** 
LN-contactcost 0.2843 0.2419 0.12 
LN-CI 0.4370 0.1106 39.49* 
Prcfym 0.1188 0.3272 36.31 
Prcdap 0.1635 0.2171 0.75 
Prcurea 0.9560 0.2657 35.97* 
Prctsp -0.1456 0.2192 -0.66 
Prcminjingu 0.5188 0.3259 15.91 
%totirgmgt -0.8852 0.4042 -21.89 
Variance parameters    
Sigma square  0.1165 0.17 65.57* 
Gama 0.9968 0.14 683.58* 
Log likelihood function = 53.90 
LR 285.46*= 0.0000 
Mean technical efficiency =  0.66 
Note: significance levels: * p<0.01, **p <0.05, ***p<0.1 
 
4.4.2.3 Output Elasticities and Return to Scale 
The results of the production function estimates to measure output elasticities and 
technical efficiency (TE) were obtained for the major common inputs used by 
farmers in rice production under irrigation farming in the study districts. The major 
inputs used were seed, fertilizer, labour, capital, and water allocation (distribution) 
strategy based on calendar of water distribution in the plots/fields (Table 9).  
 
Coefficients results for the estimated output elasticities for all inputs were as 
expected, with exception of negative signs for seed and fertilizer inputs. The 
coefficients for seed and fertilizer were negative and significant, indicating that 
perhaps low quality and poor seed varieties were used, more over at un 
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recommended rates. Similarly, on fertilizers probably were used under poor farming 
conditions like drought or flood, or else were applied at un recommended rates, 
which lowered the yields.  The output elasticities with respect to inputs were: seed (-
0.52), fertilizer (-0.21), and labour (0.1), which was positive and significant 
indicating positive relationship on the proportional of labour employed and the yields 
of output produced though very smaller.  
 
Nevertheless, all inputs elasticities were inelastic. Capital and water distribution were 
not significant, implying not important in influencing the yields produced, perhaps 
because most farmers use family labour, and the capital most employed included 
implements like ox ploughs usually owned by many households, and little or non-
cash use in their farming activities, hence capital did not matter, resulting into under 
capacity utilization of irrigation scheme (resource). Also, it might be because 
irrigation scheme depends on rainfall availability to keep functional. Though not 
significant, as expected, water distribution/allocation into plots/field was found to 
have highest elasticity (0.98), followed by capital (0.76) confirming the positive 
relationship with output production (yield).  
 
The return to scale computed as the sum of output elasticities of all inputs is 
estimated to be 1.11, implying that on average rice production farmers in the 
irrigation exhibit an increasing return to scale. Farmers are still operating at region 
one of the classical production function, which starts with zero inputs use-an 
irrational behaviour, and choosing their goal inconsistently with maximization of 
returns.  However, if all factors were increased by 1% rice production (yields) would 
increase by 1.11% (Table 4.10).  
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Table 4.10: Output Elasticities for all Inputs used 
Input variable  Elasticity 
Seed -0.52* 
Fertilizer -0.21* 
Labour 0.1* 
Capital 0.98 
Water distribution in plots/fields 0.76 
Total return to scale (RTS) 1.11 
Note: significance levels: * p<0.01, **p <0.05, ***p<0.1 
 
4.4.2.4 Production Technical Efficiency 
Table 4.11 provides results of the technical efficiency distribution by class across all 
irrigation schemes surveyed. The mean technical efficiency scores per irrigation 
scheme showed great variations among the schemes, with Igongwa and Nyida having 
the highest scores. The highest technical efficiency score in Igogwa and Nyida 
irrigation schemes is probably due to favourable weather conditions and 
technological differences among the schemes. However, observational trend studies 
would be crucial to follow up the changes over time in order to draw conclusive 
recommendations.  
  
Overall, the production technical efficiency score of farmers ranged from a minimum 
of 11% to a maximum of 97 % with a mean of 66 %. These results suggest that there 
is still a room in most of the schemes to improve the technical efficiency among 
farmers by increasing production on average by 34% from the current state of 
technologies and inputs used in these irrigation schemes, allocating better their 
disposable resources. 
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Table 4.11: Farmer TE Score Distribution by Class Per Irrigation Scheme 
TE score by class 
Percent proportion of farmers by scheme 
Ig
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1: (0.11-0.31) 6.9 7.1 17.2 7.1 0 0 3.3 
2: (0.32-0.52) 0 28.6 10.3 42.9 29.4 3.3 33.3 
3: (0.53-0.73) 3.4 21.4 51.7 7.1 52.9 23.3 36.7 
4: (> 0.74) 89.7 42.9 20.7 42.9 17.6 73.3 26.7 
 
4.4.2.5 Determinants of Technical Inefficiency in the Irrigation Systems 
Based on the variance parameters estimates (gamma and sigma –square) in Table 4. 
9 regarding the technical inefficiency structure. Five factors were identified to have 
positive effects relations on reducing technical inefficiency of farmers in the 
irrigation schemes surveyed.  
 
The coefficient for the variable ownership of irrigation land (irrgland) was negative 
and significant at 1% level, which indicates that farmers with ownership of land 
within the irrigation scheme command area tend to be less inefficient. This is perhaps 
because the land owned can be improved with certain rather than fear of eviction if 
the land is rented in. These results are supported by the findings from Gerstter et al. 
(2011), which confirmed that land ownership has greater impact on productivity 
through greater land investment for improvement and also credit access, in places 
where the land is regularized with title deeds. 
 
The governance related variable, group leadership style and discretion (Gpleader) 
had a negative coefficient and significant at 1% level, implying that increasing good 
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governance on the group leadership reduces farmers’ technical inefficiency in the 
irrigation scheme. This is expected because good leadership encourage others to 
work, but also good leadership is a key to improvement of performance.  
 
The output price coefficient (price/kg) is negative and significant at 1%, indicating 
that increasing output price reduces inefficiency in the irrigated rice production. The 
plausible explanation is obvious that price is an incentive for supply response 
accounting for farm management that is motivated by encouragement of best 
combination of inputs use and substitution of income earning to leisure. These results 
point to the need of strengthening market incentives through effective policies that 
will improve farm output profitable market access.   
 
The coefficient for the variable regarding interaction effects between non tangible 
benefits and income (NTB*income) was negative and significant at 5% level. This 
implies that as the non-tangible benefits increases the effect of income on reducing 
technical inefficiency increases. In other word, non-tangible benefits (use of CA as 
network for external service support access) has positive relationship with income 
earning, hence efficiency would be increased by the interaction of these variables.   
 
Other variables grouped into information and knowledge such as frequency of 
meetings (nofmeeting) and irrigation training (irrgtrain) had coefficients with 
positive sign and significant at 1% and 5% level respectively, indicating that the 
increase of technical inefficiency is positively influenced with the increase in the 
frequency of meetings convened, perhaps frequency of meetings reduce farm 
working time. Also the results indicate that an increase in irrigation training 
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increases technical inefficiency. This is contrary to the assumption that training (non 
formal continued education of farmers) enhances efficiency and productivity (Padhy 
and Jena, 2015). The increase in technical inefficiency is perhaps due to farmers 
failing to take advantage of opportunities in the irrigation system to move up the 
factors of production along the expansion path (Weir, 1999). This could be a result of 
risk aversion behaviour farmers have or due to bad CA organisation and management 
experienced rather than lack of information synthesis. However, the coefficient for 
the variable related to risk perception (riskpercept) was positive and insignificant, 
and hence did not matter in influencing technical inefficiency. 
 
The interaction variable related to age and capital (Age*capital) had a coefficient 
with positive sign and significant at 1% level, indicating that as farmers get older the 
effect of capital increases technical inefficiency in irrigated rice production. The 
fertilizer inputs prices (prcfym, prcdap, prctsp and prcminjingu) had coefficients 
with positive sign coefficients and not significant, with the exception of UREA 
(prcurea), which had a positive sign and significant at 1% level. The results imply 
that are increased of technical inefficiency with the use of such inputs, perhaps 
because not used in the best combination to balance the nutrients required.  
 
Demographic variables, age and sex were positive and insignificant, while formal 
education level (educ) was negative and insignificant. Though education was 
insignificant, it indicated had a positive influence in reducing technical inefficiency, 
which conformed to other studies related to the importance of education in 
improving efficiency and productivity (King and Palmer, 2006). 
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4.4.2.6   Allocative Efficiency of Factor Inputs in the Irrigated Rice Production 
Cob Douglass production function linear form was obtained by estimating OLS 
regression for the major inputs used in the rice production (seed, fertilizer, labour, 
capital, and water distribution timing strategy satisfaction of crop water requirement 
in the plots), which was imputed on cost/price basis to compute marginal physical 
product (MPP) and the value of marginal product (VMP) for each input to ascertain 
the AE. The prices for seed, fertilizer and labour inputs were based on the average 
market prices, while average capital invested was used as the price for capital.  Price 
for water distribution satisfaction was imputed based on the cost or contributions 
payable by a farmer per cropping season as water right charges in the scheme, where 
farmers normally paid one bag of paddy rice, which was converted to the equivalent 
sales market price of 45 000 TZS.  Michael et al. (2014) estimated the irrigation 
water price in the production of rice in Pangani, Ruaha and Rufiji water basin 
authorities to be 32 250 TZS per ha.  
 
Results of the marginal physical product (MPP), value of marginal product (VMP), 
marginal factor cost (MFC) and allocative efficiency (AE) of each input used for rice 
production in this study are summarized in Table 12. The MPP for labour was the 
highest, which indicated that additional labour (a person day) can increase rice yield 
by 0.75, equivalent to 67.5 kg per ha.  On the other hand, all other inputs were 
negatively correlated with the rice yield output.  An increase of 1 kg of seed is 
expected to decrease the rice yield by 0.28, equivalent to 25.4 kg per ha, of a paddy 
bag weighing on average 90kg, perhaps because most farmers do not use 
recommended rates since they use inferior seed, but also avoid risks due to rainfall/ 
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water uncertainty. Increase in 1 kg of fertilizer is also expected to decrease rice yield 
by 0.428, equivalent to 38.5 kg. The decrease in yield is probably due to poor 
nutrient balance applied for the fertilizers input used, because most farmers used 
only UREA fertilizer.  Similarly, increase in capital value, and water distribution are 
expected decrease the yield by 0.428 (38.5kg), and 0. 754 (67.8kg) respectively, 
meaning that additional value of capital and water use do not reflect rice output 
returns in the irrigation systems. 
 
The allocative efficiency (AE) of all inputs shown in Table 10 are less than 1, 
indicating that seed, fertilizers, labour, capital and water distribution are over used. 
These results confirm that farmers do not optimally allocate resources in the 
irrigation systems, despite several technical trainings related to irrigation 
technologies and good agricultural practices directed towards irrigation schemes. 
Farmers can optimally increase outputs by best combining inputs for nutrient 
balances and improvement of access to profitable output markets. This can be 
enhanced through comprehensive farmer field schools in a value chain development 
framework in the irrigation schemes.     
 
Table 4.12: MPP, VMP, MFC and AE Estimates 
Inputs MPP VMP MFC  AE 
(VMP/MFC) 
Seed -0.283177478 -283.177478 
 
2500 
 
-0.113270991 
 
Fertilizer -0.428034489 -428.0344889 
 
1500 -0.285356326 
 
Labour 0.757297041 757.2970411 3800 
 
0.199288695 
Capital -0.000423423 -0.42342314 5000 -8.46846E-05 
 
Water 
distribution 
-0.754479465 -754.4794651 45000 
 
-0.01676621 
 
 113 
4.5  The Link between Farm Household Objectives and Investment 
Enterprising Tendency in Irrigation Scheme:  Implications on CA 
Coordination Efficiency 
4.5.1 Overview  
Using 2SLS approach by correcting the endogeneity of farm household objectives 
and investment, the study examined the effect of farm household objectives- 
measured in terms of farmer orientation, (market oriented or subsistence) on 
investment enterprising tendencies as measured by individual private own annual 
expenditures implied in irrigation systems operating under CA management. The 
summary statistics and definition of variables used in the 2SLS regression are 
presented in Table 4.13.  
 
Table 4.13: Definition and Summary Statistics for all Variables used in the 
2SLS Regression 
Variable  Definition 
 
Unit measure Mean Std 
loginv Annual own expenditures Tanzaniashilling 
(currency)- logged 
12.6 1.3 
Famobject Farm household objectives  Dummy-(1= commercial,0 
=subsistence) 
0.82 0.38 
ownlandirrg Land ownership in irrigation 
command area  
 Dummy (1=yes, 
0= no) 
0.88 0.32 
Gpleader Leadership governance  style in 
the group  
Dummy- (1= good, 
 0= bad) 
0.65 0.47 
Nontangible Non tangible benefits Dummy1=information 
&external service 
access,0= none 
0.8 0.4 
Trust Trust in group members and 
leadership 
Dummy(1=trust, 0= none) 0.95 0.19 
Expirrig Experience in irrigation farming Years 8.8 5.3 
Contactcost Contact monetary costs Tanzania shillings 
(currency) 
9078.7 3848
2.6 
Sex Sex of respondent(farmer) Dummy (1=male,  
0 = female) 
0.80 0.39 
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irrgreliability Irrigation physical  
characteristics(water) reliability  
Dummy (1= reliable, 0= 
not reliable) 
0.72 0.44 
sacosaccess Sacos (financial service)  
accessibility  
Dummy(1= accessible, 
0=not accessible) 
0.22 0.41 
rateirrh2o Rate of irrigation water 
distribution 
Category(=good, 
2=satisfactory, 
3= poor) 
1.69 0.65 
Offarm Off farm activities engagement  Category(1= 
salaried,2=casual 
labour,3=small business 4= 
non) 
3.09 1.78 
Farmsucsupo Farm service support obtained Dummy (1=yes,  
0= none) 
0.25 0.43 
Quntityirrmar Output quantity marketed Bags 100.5 358.
15 
Distancemark Proximity/distance to the 
market 
Km 5.59 7.42 
Hhlabor Household member eligible for 
working on farm/labour force 
Number 3.9 2.2 
Soilirrgat Soil irrigation fertility level in 
the irrigation scheme 
Dummy (1= fertile,  
0= not fertile) 
0.37 0.48 
Irigtnypedum Irrigation type  Dummy (1= modern, 
0=traditional improved) 
0.16 0.37 
 
4.5.2  Results of 2SLS and Tests of the Endogeneity 
The data contains missing values that were list wise deleted in a complete set 
analysis and only 38-sample size remained for the final analysis.  Before presenting 
the regression results, tests of validity of instruments and endogeneinety were 
performed to provide evidence of the choice of the model.  
 
The Durbin-Wu Hausman specification test results for endogeneity rejected the null 
hypothesis that farm household objective variable (famobject) is exogenous and 
concludes that the variable famobject and investment (loginv) are all interdependent 
(endogenous), hence the use of 2SLS is appropriate in order to correct the 
endogeneity problem and establish the causality. The test results are presented in 
Table 4.14. 
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Empirical results from 2SLS regression indicate that overall, the instruments are 
jointly significant as indicated by the chi square value (p> 0.000 and R
2
. The variable 
farm household objectives (famobject)-a dummy variable measured as 1= 
commercial oriented, 0= subsistence oriented farmer had a coefficient with positive 
sign and significant at less than 5% level.  The results suggest that farm household 
objectives, notably commercial oriented production promotes positively investment 
enterprising tendency in irrigation scheme under CA. That is, a one percent increase 
in commercial orientation for a farm household increases investment on own annual 
irrigation expenditures (enterprising tendency) by 210% than their counterpart 
subsistence oriented farm households in a similar irrigation scheme.  
 
Thus, the empirical results show the importance of accounting for farm households’ 
objectives in promoting enterprising tendency in a CA setting and other collective 
entrepreneurship, such as any agricultural cooperative organizations. The implication 
is that commercial/market oriented farm households have an incentive to ensure 
coordination which is reflected in the positive investment made, as in the willingness 
to pay for services.  
 
These results are supported by other studies which indicated that the diversities in 
farmers’ objectives and livelihood strategies explained the observed differences in 
allocative and technical efficiency levels of farmers (Berkhout, 2009).  Further, these 
results point to the need, particularly in strengthening capacity of farmers on the 
aspects related to agri- business chains participation to enhance their capital 
investment for commercial oriented production objectives. This is important 
particularly in enhancing incentives for CA working in the irrigation scheme.  
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At the same time, however, farm household objectives tend to be influenced by other 
exogenous variables designated as “excluded instruments” such as output quantity 
marketed, output market distance, access to financial services /saccos (sacosaccess), 
off farm support services (off farm support), soil fertility status in the irrigation 
scheme land (soilirrgat), irrigation type -whether tradition improved or modern 
(irigtypedumy) and household labour force availability. The significance of 
endogeneity test (Table 4.14) confirmed that the assumed exclude instruments are 
valid and correctly excluded from the equation, implying that the variables are 
relevant, positively and significantly influence enterprising tendency.  
   
The included exogenous variables in the structural equation   like trust in group 
members and leadership (trust) was significant at 10% level, and positively 
influencing the investment (enterprising tendency). The results for the variable trust 
is also supported by other scholars e.g. Fafchamps (2002), pointing that trusting 
others enables economic agent to operate more efficiently, besides, it is essential for 
both economic exchange and public good delivery. Fafchamps, (2012) also argues 
that trust can reduce transaction costs, encourage respect of contract, and facilitate 
cooperation. Thus, in this respect a one percentage point increase in trust of farmers 
exerted to members and leaders in a group of CA in the irrigation scheme supports 
and encourage investment enterprising tendency by increased own expenditures of  
farm household  in the irrigation farming by 254%, and so increased coordination 
efficiency.  
 
The coefficient for sex variable (sex) had positive sign and significant at less than 
5% level, indicating that male farmers have positive effect on supporting increased 
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investment expenditure allocation in the irrigation farming under CA. In other words, 
a one percent increase in being a male farmer, increases investment and enterprising 
tendency by 148% for own annual expenditures in irrigation farming for commercial 
oriented production than are female farmers, perhaps because of the cultural setting 
usually adapted in the most Tanzanian households that men are the main decision 
maker and responsible for in most of households.  
 
The variable experience in irrigation farming (expirrig) was significant at 10% level 
and negatively correlated to influencing investment enterprising tendency. A one 
percent point increase in experience reduces the investment enterprising tendency by 
10.6%, implying that experience in irrigation farming does not matter in making 
investment venture decisions, perhaps because entrepreneurship venture is associated 
with judgmental decision under uncertainty over deployment of assets (Jos and Bart, 
2008; Klein, 2009), hence these farmers had bad experience with the historical 
information regarding the firm / resource operating environment.  
 
The coefficient for the variable of transaction cost  related to contact and information 
search cost in monetary value (contactcost) had a  negative sign and significant at 
1% level. The results indicate that a one percent increase in information search or 
contact cost reduces investment enterprising tendency by 0.002%. Though, the 
impact of reduction was not in such a significant impact, it had an implication on 
coordination incentives, particularly in the management organizations because 
information reduces the imperfections in the economic system. These results are 
supported by other studies e.g. Casson, (1998) pointing that the instrumental 
importance of contact and information is on coordination, hence an increase in 
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contact cost is likely to reduce coordination incentives as implied in the extent of 
enterprising tendency.   
 
Other variables, like ownership of land in the irrigation scheme command area 
(ownlandirrg) was negative and not significant.  Though not statistically significant 
the results indicate that farm household not owning land in the irrigation scheme 
command area had a disincentive in injecting capital investment, and so do CA 
coordination. It is acknowledged that ownership of resources is an important 
incentive for improvement (Kemper and Schumacher, 2014), hence it is obvious that 
non land owner household were likely not to honour the and under supply efforts on 
CA. This present study therefore suggests redistribution of land within the irrigation 
schemes to enhance CA successfulness.  
 
The coefficient for the group leadership style variable (gpleader) had a negative sign 
and not significant. Though not significant, it had an indication that a one percent 
increase in bad group leadership discretion reduces an incentive for CA coordination 
as proxed by annual expenditures by 19.6%.  Bad leadership undermines own private 
investment expenditures and contribution efforts supply to the public good provision, 
hence depress CA successfulness via low willingness to invest in the irrigation 
schemes.  
 
The coefficient for the variable non-tangible benefits (non tangible) such as aspects 
related to information sharing and use of CA as a bridge to access external support 
was not significant and negatively correlated to investment enterprising tendency.  A 
one percent increase in non-tangible, notably use of CA to access external support 
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and information sharing is likely to reduce investment by 25.3%. This is perhaps 
farmers have no information and knowledge regarding external support through CA 
organization, or had bad experience with support provided through collective action 
due to unequal benefit sharing. These results point to the need of strengthening and 
improvement of the negatively correlated variables to enhance incentives for 
enterprising tendency (Table 4.14).    
 
Table 4.14: Summary of 2SLS Regression Estimated Results 
Variables:  
 Dependent log(inv) 
 
Independent coefficient SE Z value 
Famobject 2.10975 1.09 1.93** 
Sex 1.48664 0.63 2.35** 
Ownlandirrg -0.06924 0.91 -0.08 
Gpleader -0.19679 0.68 -0.29 
Nontangible -0.25378 0.34 -0.74 
Trust 2.54401 1.44 1.76*** 
Expirrig -0.10662 0.06 -1.91** 
Contactcost -0.00002 4.99 -4.65* 
Constant 8.58139 2.11 4.05* 
Endogeneity test: Durbin Wu Hausman specification test: 
Durbin (score) chi
2
 (1) = 11.5231 (P value =0.0007) 
Wu-Hausman F(1, 28) =12.186 (P value = 0.0016) 
Instrumented: Farm household objectives 
Excluded instruments: 
 
 
N=38 
Wald chi
2
 (8)=45.09 
Prob> chi
2
=0.0000 
R
2
=0.4551 
Irrgreliability, sacosaccess, rateh20, offarm, 
farmsacsuport, quantityirrmarkt, distancemarket, 
hhlabor,soilirrgat,irigtnypedumy, 
Notes: Significance levels: * = p<1%, ** = p<5%, and ***= p<10%  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1  Conclusion 
The main conclusion which can be drawn in this study is that collective action in rice 
irrigation systems management involve higher transaction costs with regards to 
contact, control, and contract compliance. The higher TCs are aggravated by asset 
specificity: site asset specificity like soil fertility, water availability and distribution 
since most of irrigation schemes depend on rainfall, and human capital asset 
specificity in  form of  number of labour involved, irrigation technologies application 
knowldege, improved seed and other inputs (fertilizers, labour and capital) use, and 
market oriented production, which were important TCs attributes detected increasing 
or decreasing CA successfulness outcome of interest. 
 
Specifically, the conclusion can be categorised into four variants: First, irrigation 
farming ecosystem choice (type 1 farmer) is a non-random choice motivated by 
several factors influencing self-selection effects. Hence, selection of members for 
organised CA establishment should base on factors such as families with greater 
number of members eligible and engaged in farming at household much as market 
for  labour is imperfect and mechanisation is rudimental; non tangible benefits, 
particularly using  organised CA as a bridge (network) to help farmers get support 
from various external service providers in implementing sustainable farming 
practises; and  good working of rules in the irrigation group is important to stimulate 
attitude related to frequent contributions and respect of law on  public service 
provision through good leadership and rules enforcement.  
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On the other hand, factors which impose negative effects/challenges that discourage 
farmers from fully exerting commitment effort contributions in the irrigation farming 
ecosystem were: dodging contributions (factor2), and violation of rules/ bylaws 
(Factor3), which were also relevant motivation for farmers’ self-selection. These 
factors should be accounted for because their impacts are important for 
understanding CA members’ incomes ability and motivation, and recruitment 
strategy for public services provision. They are also important in understanding 
setting up contribution level/amount affordable by all members to enhance 
compliance rate.  
 
Second, the study examined the determinants of institutional quality.  The conclusion 
is that transaction costs, particularly information sharing among farmers (contact) 
and control/ formal penalty as well as market characteristics such as increased output 
quantity sold significantly influenced institution quality.  On contrary, increased 
market distance, presence of water distribution calendar amongst farmers, and 
rainfall variability negatively influenced institutional quality. In other word, their 
increase reduces the level of (compliance) institution quality there by increasing TC 
related to control.  
 
Third, the irrigation system operating environment (CA organisation and transaction 
costs) affect the productivity in terms of technical and allocative efficiency of factors 
of production. The study concluded that the technical efficiency reached at an 
average of 66% indicating there is a potential to increase the efficiency by 34% using 
best combination of inputs and existing technologies by improving the CA 
organisational management.  Households with land ownership within the command 
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area, and group characteristics of good governance (group leadership), interaction 
between non tangible benefits like use of CA as network for external support 
services and income (i.e. income generating activities in the scheme), and output 
prices have greater impact on improving technical efficiency.  
 
On the other hand, variables related to training, transaction costs such as frequency 
of meetings and contact costs like phone (information) or travel costs increased 
technical inefficiency. The allocative efficiencies of production factors are not 
optimal. There are no incentives for best combination of inputs/factor resources 
utilization in the irrigation schemes because all inputs were overused. This can be 
attributed to (i) un organised CA operating environment, which make farmers fail 
using resources to move along the expansion path despite of several trainings offered 
in the irrigation schemes (ii) poor input-output markets for the commodity under 
question in the study area (iii) uncoordinated training and knowledge transfer related 
to good agricultural practices and irrigation technologies. 
 
Fourth, the study concluded that farm household objectives, particularly 
commercial/market oriented production objective is an incentive for CA coordination 
efficiency in the irrigation systems, as is reflected in the level of enterprising 
tendencies (like the willingness to pay for the service) measured by investment value 
committed.  Other exogenous variables designated as “excluded instruments” which 
positively and significantly supported the farm household commercial/market 
oriented objective, such as output quantity marketed, market distance, access to 
financial services /saccos, off farm support services (off farm support), soil fertility 
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status in the irrigation scheme land, irrigation type, and household labour force 
availability had the greatest support in policy prescription for CA coordination.        
   
5.2  Recommendations 
5.2.1  Policy Recommendations 
The following four broader policy recommendations are drawn from the findings in 
this thesis. 
 
(i) Streamline irrigation members’ selection criteria for collective action 
recruitment in the irrigation systems 
The water sector policy provides for the guidelines and issuance of common water 
rights permit for eligible irrigator members’ recruitment for irrigation farming, 
allowing for any person holding plots within the scheme. This criterion is sufficient 
to prevent some eligible committed farmers to participate in the irrigation farming 
because it is not guaranteed that a person owning a plot within the irrigation scheme 
is willing and committed to participate fully in irrigation collective action. Evidence 
from this research on how farmer self-select into farming ecosystem types indicate 
that farmers self-select into irrigation farming ecosystem on the basis of several 
factors, which include ability of household family labour force supply, potential to 
use the collective action organisation as a linkage network to access external service 
support that link to postharvest and agribusiness chains among others. Thus selection 
of irrigator members for effective and successful CA should take into account such 
recruitment criteria. In other words, the pre-condition to successful CA is the 
recruitment of household with high labour force engaged in farming selected in a 
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non-random fashion, and clearly linked CA organisation with other functions such as 
networking and agri-business management for the produced outputs in the irrigation 
scheme.  
 
(ii)  Strengthen irrigation schemes’ institutional quality 
To address the current variations of institution quality between and within the 
schemes management, formal penalties for defaulters in form of court cases or local 
level formal procedures implementation like charging criminals to the local authority 
e.g. to the village executive officers should be strengthened because have shown 
positive relationship with increase in institutional quality level. This can be achieved 
through well drafted irrigator group members’ constitutions, which are enforceable. 
Enforcement is usually accompanied by good leadership, transparency, trust and 
accountability. Thus the constitutions made should be recognised at macro level 
irrigation management authorities and government judiciary level. Other areas which 
require attention in order to enhance institutional quality include increased output 
quantity sold, and reduction of output market distance, as well as informal penalties. 
These variables have indicated strong influence on institutional quality (compliance).   
 
(iii)  Enhance agricultural technologies and good agricultural practices use in 
the irrigation systems     
Good agricultural practices and technologies exist for enhancing production 
technical and allocative efficiencies for input factors. Research findings in this thesis 
have revealed inefficiencies in production and input factor resource allocation that is 
caused by weak external environment, a proxy for CA. The internal efficiency 
improvement can be achieved through introduction of mechanisation to overcome 
 125 
the high number of household members to work in the irrigation farming. It can also 
be through capacity building to improve technical efficiency and allocative 
efficiency, which all together were identified to be at sub-standard levels. At the 
same time, the external efficiency (CA) improvement is crucial to enhance internal 
efficiency (technical and allocative efficiency) improvement. 
 
(iv)   Build enterprising tendency among irrigator farmers 
Entrepreneurship is the key driver to enhance organisation coordination and 
investment in the irrigation schemes. Results have indicated positive relationship 
between farm household objectives- particularly market oriented production and 
investment tendency under risky environment of water uncertainty management in 
the irrigation systems. Thus, building enterprising mentality amongst farmers by 
carefully accounting for farm individual household objectives will enhance 
coordination and successfulness of CA. This can be done through developing 
comprehensive training program for CA management that is especially tailor made 
of building trust among member farmers, and taking into account market oriented 
production, which positively influenced enterprising tendency, and encouragement of 
good governance (group leadership)- which was a disincentive for individual own 
investment in the irrigation.   
 
5.2.2  Recommendations for Further Research 
The research that has been undertaken for this thesis has highlighted several issues 
on which further research would be important.  Several areas where information 
(gaps) identified were highlighted in the literature review, whilst some of these gaps 
have been addressed in this thesis, but others remain. 
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In particular, observational studies on trends for the CA members’ recruited 
behaviour for irrigation farming, enterprising tendency and technological change 
over time have not been covered. Further research might for example look into trends 
and dynamic aspects in the irrigation systems under collective management. 
 
 Much as this thesis has focused at only micro level, further research can also look 
into the linkages between micro level institutions and compatibility to the macro 
level institutional linkages. What are the missing or failed policies, how do macro 
level institutional arrangement support or deter micro level institutions 
successfulness. 
 
Further, this research has used transaction costs, mostly implied as proxies due to 
difficulties of their measurement; further research might consider conducting a 
research to establish standard measure of various key transaction costs.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix  1: Questionnaires used for Cross Section Data Collection 
 
1: Identification Information 
Date of Interview: _ _ _ _ / __ _ / _ _ _ _  
 Name of enumerator …………………… 
Region: ------------------------                                      District:  ------------------------ 
Ward: -------------------------------------------  Village: --------------------------------- 
 Irrigation scheme name:…………………………………….  
Type of irrigation scheme:   1= tradition, 2= modern………………………………. 
Water catchment area: 1=Lake Victoria, 2= River, 3= underground, 4= others 
……………………… 
 Water basin zone: ……………………………………… 
Respondent’s phone number…………………………………… 
 
2: Farm Household characteristics  
2.1 Household beneficiary on irrigation scheme farming participation: 1= 
participating household, 0 = Non participating household----------------------- 
2.2 Name of household head (respondent) responsible for decision making in the 
farming operations ……………………………… 
2.3 Sex of household head (respondent) responsible for decision making in the 
farming operations: 1= male, 0= female ……………………….. 
2.4 Age of   respondent …………………………years. 
2.5 Number of years the respondent is consecutively permanently living in the 
village without migration/mobility……………….years 
2.6 Indicates the number of members at household:  No. of adult females>15 [         ] 
Number of adult males above 15 yrs [       ] Number of members below 15 years [     ] 
Number of members above 64 years [      ] 
 2.7 Number of members on the farm household eligible for farm labour supply 
……………. 
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2.8 Total time allocated between off farm and irrigated farm: Total time per 
season……………..hrs/days, Time allocated for irrigated farm and collective 
activities……………………..hrs/days, time allocated for off farm activities 
………………….hrs/days. 
 2.9 Type of labour used for irrigated farm works: 1=family labour: 
hours…………days………………, 2= hired labour: hours………… 
days……………, 3= exchange labour: hours……………days………………. 
2.10 Type of labour used for rain fed farm works: 1= family labour: 
hours………………days…………………., 2= hired labour: hours………… 
days…………………., 3= exchange labour: hours……………days………………. 
2.11 Marital status of respondent:  1=Married living with spouse, 2=Married but 
spouse away, 3=Divorced/separated, 4=Widow/widower, 5=Not married, 6= others 
……………..  
2.12 Respondent’s  education level: 1=No formal education, 2= primary drop out, 3 
=Primary level (std vii), 4=Secondary drop out, 5=Secondary level (ordinary), 
6=Secondary level (advanced ), 7=Tertiary (college/university)…………… 
2.13 Indicate other off farm activities you are involved: 1=none, 2= Salaried 
employment, 4= small enterprises/business 5=Casual labourer, 6=Other 
(Specify)……………………………….. 
2.14 Estimate the total annual amount earned from off farm activities: 
…………………………Tzs 
 
3 Farmer’s attitude and self selection into groups & farming types 
3.1 Are you a member of collective action irrigation group: 1= yes, 0= no………….. 
3.2 Type 1 farmer: Rice Farming ecosystem depended for rice production: 1= fully 
rain fed agriculture, 0= otherwise…………………. 
3.3 Type 2 farmer: Rice Farming ecosystem depended for rice production: 1= fully 
irrigated farming, 0 = otherwise…………………. 
3.4 Did you grow rice on rain fed ecosystem farming for the last cropping season 
1=yes, 0= no……………………… 
3.5 Did you grow rice on irrigated ecosystem farming for the last cropping season 
1=yes, 0= no……………………… 
3.6 For the rainfed farming ecosystem in (3.2) above indicates acreage grown rice 
under this ecosystem for the last cropping 
season.………………………………..acres 
 140 
3.7 For the irrigated farming ecosystem in (3.3) above indicates acreage grown rice 
under this ecosystem for the last cropping season………………………………..acres  
3. 8 Type 3 farmers: Rate the following attitudinal statements towards irrigation 
farming commitment in a collective action:  
3.8.1 The current organisation and function of collective action for irrigation farming 
is good for encouraging members to work together in a committed way: 1= strongly 
disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Agree, 4= strongly agree………….. 
3.8.2 In order to obtain high yields and benefits in the irrigation scheme you need to 
do something including cheating, stealing water, and violation of collective action 
rules: 1= strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Agree, 4= strongly agree…………..  
3.8.3 In general, do you have desire and willingness to engage in irrigation farming 
and respect collective action contractual agreements and commitments there in:  1= 
strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Agree, 4= strongly agree………….. 
3.8.4 Irrigation farming and collective action rules are biased/ designed to benefit 
certain irrigation group members. Therefore it is useless to respect the collective 
action rules and regulations: 1= strongly disagree, 2= Disagree,3=  Agree, 4= 
strongly agree…………………. 
3.8.5 Do you frequently contribute all required membership fee and labour in a 
collective action for irrigation farming as per regulations and rules set out: 1= 
strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Agree, 4= strongly agree………………………… 
3.8.6 Do you believe that membership fee and other compulsory contributions in a 
collective action for irrigation farming are useless because you do not depend much 
on irrigation scheme for your food and income: 1= strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 
3= Agree, 4= strongly agree……………………... 
 3. 9 What attributes drives you to consider most in choosing an irrigation group 
membership to join: 1= group of familiar associate members/neighbours, 2 = join 
any group with members from elsewhere ……………………………….. 3= 0thers 
(specify) …………………………….. 
3.10 Indicates the annual percent compulsory contribution of collective action efforts 
for irrigation operations both monetary and non monetary:  
Total Labour days/hours required per season…………days/hrs, amount 
contributed……….days/hours;  
Total monetary required per season…..……………………..Tzs; amount contributed 
………………………Tzs  
Total in kind payment after harvest ……………………Bags or kg;  amount 
contributed………………………………bags or kg 
 
3.11 Based on your preferences, indicate the preferred acceptable annual percent 
compulsory contribution of collective action efforts for irrigation operations both 
monetary and non monetary you would like to contribute:  
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Total Labour days/hours required per season…………days/hrs, amount 
contributed……….days/hours;  
Total monetary required per season…..……………………..Tzs; amount contributed 
………………………Tzs  
Total in  kind payment after harvest ……………………Bags or kg;  amount 
contributed………………………………bags or kg 
3.12 Give reasons in 3.11 
above…………………………………………………………………………………
………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………. 
3.13 Other membership to famer organisations/clubs or associations in the 
community 
Type 
of 
associ
ation 
for 
which 
is a 
memb
er 
Code 
A 
HH 
indivi
dual 
who 
is a 
mem
ber 
Code 
B 
 
Associ
ation/g
roup 
functio
ns 
Code 
C 
(rank 
3) 
Year 
joined 
Entry 
fee 
(Tzs) 
Annual 
subscri
ption 
(Tzs) 
Num
ber 
of 
atten
ded 
meeti
ngs 
per 
year 
still a 
mem
ber 
to 
date 
1=ye
s, 0 
no 
If not 
a 
mem
ber 
now 
indic
ate 
year 
stopp
ed 
Reason 
for 
leaving 
the 
group 
membe
rship 
Code 
D 
          
          
          
          
 
Code A = 1, SACOS, 2= producer marketing group,3= local administrated, 4= agric 
production group, 5=others ……………….. 
Code B= 1= Household head, 2=spouse, 3=son/daughter, 4=parent, 5= Grandchild, 
6= others ……………………….. 
Code C = 1= produce/livestock marketing, 2= input access/marketing function, 
3=seed production and marketing, 4= farmer research group, 5= farmer extension 
group, 6= local administration, 7 =others…………………………………………….. 
Code D = 1= resigned for personal reasons sake, 2= the organisation was not useful, 
3= group management not good, 4= unable to pay annual subscription, 5= finished 
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activities required joint action, 6= others 
……………………………………………… 
3.14 Type 4 farmer:  Do you have rights to access irrigation water through formal 
water rights permit granted? 1= yes, 0 = no………………………………………… 
3.15 If no in (3. 14) above how do you access irrigation water for your irrigated 
farm? 1= use water without permit, 2= bribe water distribution committee or block 
leaders, 3= dodge some contributions/payments 4= steal water ……………………… 
3.14 Please indicate whether you 1= strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Agree, 4= 
strongly agree in the following statements in 3.16. 1; 3.16.2; 3.16.3 & 3.16.4 
respectively:  
3.16.1 Without dodging some contributions in collective action - irrigation farming is 
not worthwhile (profitable) venture ……………………………………………… 
3.16.2 We are required to participate in all collective action contributions to make 
irrigation scheme functional and sustainable for the betterment of our livelihood on 
food and income……………………………………….. 
3.16.3 I worry to pay all contributions in a collective action organisation because 
fund are misused or benefits few members ………………………………………… 
3.16.4 I do participate in all contributions even if misused because the scheme is the 
only resource I depend for livelihood- food and income…………………………… 
 3. 17  What  tasks do you normally perform  jointly  in a collective action for 
irrigation farming operations: 1…………………………………………….., 
2…………………………………….., 
3……………………………………………….., 
4…………………………………………, 5…………………………………..  
3. 18 What areas/tasks other than those in (3.13) above are performed individually 
but require collective action in the irrigation farming operation: 
1………………………......2……………………..3…………………………………
………..,4…………………………………………………, 
5…………………………………… 
Give reasons for your responses in (3. 14) above………………………….………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
3.19 What are the potential non tangible benefits of collective action in your farming 
operations?  
1= technology and information sharing, 2= personal farmer to farmer helpfulness 3= 
Produce marketing power, 4= Use of collective action group as a link to external 
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agents for services supports, 5 others (specify)………………………………… 
(Note: more than one answer is acceptable). 
3.20  How do you perceive the working of rules and laws regarding the collective 
action in the group for irrigation farming operations?  
1= Good, 2= fair, 3 = discourage cooperative behaviour………………………… 
 
4. Irrigation group characteristics, transaction costs /management, and 
governance 
4.1 How does the process of group formation for irrigation water users association is 
crafted: 1= need of farmers  themselves to solve common interest (demand driven), 
2= crafted and introduced by  government/ external agents in order to be granted 
water right permit (supply oriented)………………………. 
4.2 Do you trust the interactions with fellow members on issues pertaining to 
irrigation resource utilization and collective action: 1= yes, 0= no 
4.3. If no in (4.2) above give reasons: 1…………………………2……………… 
3………………………………………………… 
4.3 Indicates the number of years (experience) of membership in the irrigation water 
users group…………………………... years 
4.4 What are the conditions required to join an irrigation group membership: 1= 
entry fee, 2= entry and annual fees, 3=resident of the village within the scheme, 4= 
land holding within the scheme, 5= others (specify) 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………… (Note: more than one response is acceptable) 
 
4.5 Are you aware of the rights and duties/obligations you are supposed to fulfil as a 
member of a collective action in the irrigation farming operations: 1=yes, 0= no 
4.6 if yes in (4.4) above mention them: (i) Rights as a 
member…………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………… (ii) Obligations/duties as a member………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………… 
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…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………… 
4.7 How do you rate the group leadership/governance style in fulfilling your 
expectation on irrigation services provision: 1= good, 2= fair, 3= 
unfair………………………………. 
Give reasons for your response in (4.6) above: 1…………………,2………………… 
3…………………………….,4…………………………………………., 
5……………………………………………….  
4.8 How do you rate the irrigation water distribution manner in meeting crop water 
requirement of your irrigated plots/ farm:  1= satisfactory, 2= fair, 3= poor 
…………………………… 
4.9 What costs are involved in fulfilling agreement (contract signing) to access water 
and irrigation services (both monetary and non monetary: monetary e.g. travel cost) 
Tzs……………………….; non monetary e.g. Labour/time spent on negotiation 
agreement …………….. Hours/days  
4.10  Average costs and time spent on contact issues and information search/ sharing 
related to irrigation farming matters e.g. use of phones or time spent on meetings: 
Tzs …………………… time hours/days…………………… 
4.11 Average number of frequency of meetings for irrigation activities per 
season/year ………………………………… 
4.12 Average number of frequency of irrigation extension technical services support 
provided during cropping season ………………………………… 
4.13 Does your group organization/leadership has modes for linking up (network) 
with service providers on irrigation services:  1= yes, 0 = no…………………….. 
4.14  If yes in (4.11) above indicates the networking modes: 1…………………… 
2………………………………………………,3……………………………………
……….., 4…………………………………. 
4.15 What are the costs you incur/contributes in a collective group to enhance the 
networking modes mentioned in (4.13) above (monetary and non monetary costs): 
Tzs or time (hours): 1……………………………………………, 
2…………………………………….., 3…………………………… 
4 
………………………………………………………………….5…………………… 
4.16 Does your irrigation group management have employed security guard for 
monitoring violations at the scheme on irrigation operations:  1= yes, 2= 
no…………………………………… 
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4.17 if no in (3.15) above how do violations of regulations and procedures at the 
scheme are controlled:  1= self enforcing by all members, 0 = 
none…………………………… 
4.18 Do you directly pay or contributes any costs for monitoring violations in the 
irrigation management safeguard:  1= yes, 0= none …………………………. 
4.19 If yes in (4.17) above indicates the monitoring/safeguard costs directly 
contributed: monetary Tzs…………………. and non monetary (time/effort-
hours/days……………………… 
5 Irrigation farming resources utilization, technologies perception and adoption 
5.1 Estimated total land allocated for growing rice at the household ____________ 
acres: 
(i) Lowland rain fed ecosystem…………………………..  acres 
(ii) Lowland irrigated ecosystem…………………………. acres 
(iii) Upland rain fed ecosystem………………………………acres 
5.2 Do you own land within the irrigation scheme command area: 1=yes, 0= 
no……………………….. 
5.3 Average land holdings owned and hired for irrigation farming: 
Owned………………..acres, 
Hired …………………………… acres 
5.4 Indicate the land hiring costs per acre in the irrigation scheme command 
area………………………………. Tzs 
5.5 indicates in the table below the use of various farm inputs for the irrigation 
farming in the system 
Inputs Quantity 
applied 
(kg/litres/numbe
r)/acre 
Purchase 
prices/cost per 
unit (Tzs) 
Input 
market 
distance 
(km) 
Perception of technology 
/input use 
5.5.1 Fertilizer use 1= 
Yes, 0= No:…………. 
    
4.5.2. Type of fertilizer 
(1 = FYM,  2 = DAP,  
3=Urea,  4 = TSP, 5= 
Others_________) 
    
4.5.3  Cost of fertilizer 
application/labour 
(Tzs) 
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5.5.4  Use of 
chemicals:  1= Yes, 2= 
No : If no, skip 
    
5.5.5 Types (1= 
Insecticide, 2 = 
Herbicides, 
3=fungicide    4= 
Others………………..  
    
5.5.6 Cost of chemical  
application/labour  
(Tzs) 
    
5.5.7  Use of improved  
rice seed 
1=yes, 0= no 
    
5.5.8 Rice varieties 
types (1=SARO5, 2 = 
Tai              3=  
Komboka      4= 
Others……………. 
    
5.5.9 Cost of  
improved seed 
application/sowing 
labour (Tzs) 
    
5.5.10 Farm Labour 
use1= family 2= hired, 
3=both family and 
hired, 4= 
others…………………
. 
    
5.5.11 Total  cost of  
labour  (Tzs) 
    
1. hired     
2. family      
3. shared/ in kind     
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5.6 Fill in the subsequent question for External factors determining use and 
accessibility of irrigation services (proxied by cropping intensity-CI): 
5.6.1 Total irrigation farm land cultivated ………………………………….. acres 
5.6.2 Net area sown on irrigation farm land cultivated ……………………. Acres 
5.6.3 Rules and arrangement for water distribution and accessibility: 1= Good, 0= 
poor……… 
5.6.4 Management strategies employed to provide irrigation services at the irrigation 
group: 1= good, 0= poor …………………………. 
5.6.5 In (5.6.4) list the management strategies employed to provide irrigation 
services to users 1…………………………………………………….. 
2…………………………………………., 3……………………… 
4…………………………………………………….5………………………………
……………6…………………………… 
 
5.7 Technology characteristics and irrigation farming knowledge  
5.7.1 Distance of the irrigation scheme from the homestead (proximity) 
……………………km 
5.7.2 Have you ever received any technical Irrigation farming training skills: 1=yes, 
0 = no……………………………… 
5.7.3 Technical ability to implement and manage irrigation farming 1=yes, 0= 
no…………………  
5.7.4 Do you have the knowledge of field levelling for efficient irrigation water 
application 1= yes, 0 no ……………………… 
5.7.5 Do you know crop water requirement for your irrigated crops 1= yes, 0= 
no………………… 
5.7.6 What is the location of your irrigated farm within the scheme along the canal 
1= head end, 2= middle, 3 end/ tail………………………………………………….  
5. 7.7 On what interval / timing do you apply water for your irrigated crops 1= 
morning & evening, 2= morning time, 3= evening time, 4, any time including after 
noon……………………. 
5.7.8 Irrigation scheme characteristics: 1= lined cemented canal, 0 = earth 
canal…………………………… 
5.7.9 Do the scheme has division boxes for distribution of water from canal to the 
field 1=yes, 0 = non…………………………. 
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5.7.10 Do the scheme designed with the drainage system for recycling away used 
water 1=yes, 0 =non………………………… 
5.7.11 What are the water lifting devices application used in the irrigation farming: 
1= water pumps, 2= Pump house 3= water can, 3= others (specify) 
………………………………………  
5.7.12 Indicate the interval/number of days for water distribution rotation (shifting 
water) from other canal into your canal (plot) ……………………………………….  
5.7.13 What is the status of irrigation scheme reliability for your irrigation farming 
during the season: 1=Reliable, 0= not reliable …………………………. 
5.7.14 If the scheme is not reliable in (5.7.13) give reason why: ………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
5.7.15 If the scheme is not reliable in (5.7.13)above  what are the  adjustment  or 
copping strategies employed for livelihood 
sustenance……………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
5.7.16 Indicates the factors fostering (both pull and push factors) irrigation 
technology adoption 
 (a) Push (motivating) factors: ……………………………………………………… 
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................ 
(b) Pull (discouraging) factors: ……………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………  
5.8 Household motivation for irrigation facilities use AND marketing 
5.8.1 Do you have SACOS or any financial service organisation support for 
enhancing your farming operation 1= yes, 0= no ………………………….. 
5.8.2 Do you have access to SACOS/financial organisation’s loan for enhancing your 
irrigation farming 1= yes, 0= none 
5.8.3 Indicate the amount of loan borrowed for use in irrigation farming last 
season………………………………..Tzs 
5.8.4 Total rice yield obtained from rain fed ecosystem production 
…………………………… bag  
5.8.5 Total rice yield obtained from irrigated ecosystem farm land 
……………………………..bags 
 149 
5.8.6 Average rice Output market prices …………………………………………… 
Tzs per bag 
5.8.7 Quantity of irrigated rice output marketed …………………………….. bags 
5.8.8 Quantity of rain fed rice output marketed ………………………………bags 
5.8.9 What type or form of rice product was sold 1= paddy, 2= milled rice , 3= 
both…………………….. 
5.8.10 Who are the most frequent buyers of your rice produce 1= consumer or other 
farmer, 2= rural assembler (vendors), 3= middle men, 4= urban grain traders, 5= rice 
millers, 6= exporters, 7= others…………………………………. 
5.8.11 Common place of selling of your rice produce 1= farm gate, 2=village weekly 
market, 3= town market, 4= Factory/mill, 5= others………………………………. 
5.8.12 Average market distance for the output/rice sold ………………………….. 
Km 
5.8.13 Mode of transport to the market 1=bicycle,2= hired truck, 3=public transport, 
4= carts, 5=head,=6 others…………… 
5.8.14 Indicates the transport time to the market for produce marketing ………..hrs 
5.8.15 Indicates the transport cost for marketing produce per unit 
…………………………………………..Tzs per bag 
5.8.16 indicate the kind of sell for your produce 1= loose, 2= packed 
………………………………….. 
5.8.17 Indicate the sells tax, levy or charges incurred……………………….Tzs  
5.8.18 Soil fertility status of the irrigation rice farm land: 1= good, 2= fair, 3= 
poor……………………… 
5.8.19 Soil fertility status of the rain fed rice farm land: 1= good, 2 fair, 3= poor 
5.8.20 Crops grown for irrigation farming: 1= rice, 0= others ………………… 
(Specify)  
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
5.8.21 What crop type would you like to grow in the irrigation scheme 
…………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
5.8.22 Duration at which irrigation farming operations is performed 1= seasonal, 0= 
all year round ………………………………………….. 
6. Irrigation farming investment choices and enterprising tendency 
6.1 Irrigation farming objectives: 1= commercial/ marketable surplus, 0 =subsistence 
………… 
6.2 Household asset ownerships: 
6.2. 1 Number of livestock owned: 1 cattle………………………. 2 Shots (sheep & 
goat)……………… 
3 Poultry …………………………… 4 others………………………… 
6.2.2 Irrigation mechanisation used: 1=Ox plough 2= power tiller, 3= tractor 4 = 
Others ……… 
6.2.3 Irrigation farm equipment ownership 1= yes, 0 no……………………………. 
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6.2.3 If yes in (6.2.3) above indicate in the table below the number and type of 
irrigation equipments owned including total annual expenditure for irrigation 
farming invested: 
Type of 
asset/irrigati
on 
equipment  
Number 
owned  
Original 
value 
(Tzs) 
Year 
bought 
Useful 
life 
(years) 
Numb
er 
hired  
Hiring 
cost 
per 
season 
(Tzs) 
Other own 
annual 
total 
variable 
expenditur
e 
investment 
in 
irrigation 
farming 
(Tzs) e.g 
electricity, 
fuel, 
compulsor
y fees, 
land 
improvem
ent 
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
6.3 Valuation and ranking of livelihood opportunities in the region/area 
6.3.1 Do you know any other economic opportunity other than irrigation resource for 
farming, which you can exploit for your livelihood in this area/village: 1= yes, 0= no  
6.3.2 If yes in (6.3.1) above list the potential non farming opportunities available: 
1…………………….. 
2…………………………………………………..3…………………………………4
……………………………………… 
5……………………………………………………6…………………………………
……7………………………………… 
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6.3.3 For the potential livelihood opportunities mentioned in (6.3.2) above valuate 
and rank in the table below the importance for livelihood contributions against 
irrigation resources 
s/n Livelihood 
opportunity 
available   
Livelihood ( 
food & 
income) 
contribution 
valuation 
score: 1= 
low, 2= 
medium, 3 = 
high 
Livelihood  
importance 
contribution 
rank 
Perceived 
level of 
risk 
2 = high 
1= 
moderate 
0= low 
Reasons Does the 
livelihood 
opportunity 
accessible 
to you?  
1= yes,     
0=  no 
1 Irrigation 
resource 
(scheme) 
     
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
 
6.3.4 For the total household income earned per year indicate the proportions 
invested for farm and non- farm enterprises:  estimated total 
income…………………Tzs; proportion farm investment……………….(Tzs) or %; 
and proportion non- farm investment ………………(Tzs) or % 
 
6.3.5 Indicate what type of investment was made for the proportions allocated for 
farm and nonfarm investments in (6.3.4) above: 
Farm investment made: 1………………………..2………………………….3……… 
4……………………..5…………………………..6…………………………………  
Non Farm investment made: 
1……………………………2………………………………….3…………………… 
4………………………………………..5…………………………………………..6
…  
     Thanks,  & lets cooperate to solve the social dilemma of the commons ‘‘things 
will work out badly if everybody behaves antisocially’’ 
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Appendix  2: Questionnaires used for Panel Data Collection 
 
(a) IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION  
1.1. Date of interview/data collection _____________________________ 
1.2. Data collected by___________________________________________ 
1.3. Region___________________________________________________ 
1.4. Basin zone________________________________________________  
1.5. District___________________________________________________ 
SECTION 2: Group dynamics and institutional quality 
 
PART ‘’A’’: BASIN LEVEL 
2.1 Basin information and water management and control 
2.1.1 Hydrology characteristics of basin water sources: 1= Lake Victoria basin, 2= 
river 3= internal drainage, 4= Dam, 5= Rainfall_________________  
2.1.2 Amount of rainfall trend for the past 10 years (mm) 
     2003-------------------- 
     2004-------------------- 
    2005-------------------- 
    2006-------------------- 
    2007-------------------- 
    2008-------------------- 
    2009--------------------- 
    2010--------------------- 
    2011--------------------- 
    2012--------------------- 
    
2.1.3 How is the market process for water rights permit granting conducted? 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
 153 
____________________________________________________________________
_____________________ 
2.1.4 Indicates in the table below the qualification conditions and associated costs for 
granting water rights permit to irrigation water users: 
 Water 
right 
Permit 
type  
Absolute 
total 
Cost* 
(Tzs) 
Conditions 
required to 
qualify 
securing 
water right 
permit 
Annual 
fee (if 
any) Tzs 
Average 
number of 
days 
required to 
process up 
to granting 
a permit 
Lifespan/duration 
of tenure of water 
right permit 
(months) 
1       
2       
3       
4       
Notice: 
* list the associated items for the absolute total 
costs:_____________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.1.5 Indicates in the table below the demand trend for irrigation water rights permit 
for resource users for the past 10 years: 
  
s/n  
Time 
(Year) 
Type of 
permit 
 
Water right 
permit cost 
(Tzs) 
Number of 
applicants 
(groups) 
Irrigation 
system* 
1=modern 
2=tradition 
3= both 
Number of 
permit issued 
for irrigation 
systems* 
  1      2 
1 2003       
.        
.        
11 2013       
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2.1.6 Water rights permit annual fee/levy collection trend and compliance rate 
s/n Year Number of water 
rights permit  
granted to 
irrigation Groups 
Number of groups 
complied annual 
fee payment 
Percent 
compliance 
Reasons for 
compliance 
rate 
1 2003     
.      
.      
.      
11 2013     
  
2.1.7 Water allocation and conflict resolution made over time in different selected 
schemes and/or groups (indicates in the table below) 
Yea
r 
Name 
of 
scheme
/irrigati
on 
group 
Area 
served 
water 
by the 
scheme 
(ha) 
Numb
er of 
farmer
s 
served 
irrigati
on 
water 
Water 
allocated 
per year 
(abstracti
on) 
Mm
3 
 
Ways 
of 
enforcin
g 
agreem
ent on 
water 
use 
Number 
of water 
users  
conflict
s 
reported 
per year 
Number of 
conflicts 
resolved  
 
Formal/informa
l 
200
3 
        
.         
.         
201
3 
        
 
2.1.8 What other costs-both monetary and non monetary are involved in conflict 
resolution negotiations amongst parties?____________ 
____________________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________________
______________ 
2.1.9 Describe the Information distribution structure of interaction between water 
basin authority and water users for enhanced water management and conflicts among 
water users (irrigators): who knows what; when, and how? 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
2.1.10 Do the above information help to enforce contract agreement over time 
period? 
1= yes, 0 = otherwise____________________________ 
2.1.11 If no in (1.1.10 above) give reasons: 
________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
______________ 
 
2.1.12 What other information/ effects on enhancing water management are not 
included in the optimizing process or rule of thumb results in the decision making  of 
water users? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
PART ‘’B’’: IRRIGATION SCHEME LEVEL FOR GROUP ANALYSIS 
2.2 Irrigation scheme characteristics, Institutions, and Transaction costs for 
irrigation water services provision and management at scheme level 
2.2.1 Region_____________ District_______________Ward___________ 
Village_________ 
2.2.2 Name of irrigation scheme______________________, 
2.2.3 Type of irrigation scheme: 1= traditional 2= modern ______________ 
2.2.4 Irrigation scheme canal characteristics: 1= lined cemented canal 2= non lined 
un cemented canal_________________________ 
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2.2.5 Do the scheme has division boxes for distribution of water from canal to the 
field 1=yes, 0 = non 
2.2.6 Do the scheme designed with the drainage system for recycling away used 
water 1=yes, 0 =non  
2.2.7 Age of irrigation scheme service provision since started operation: 1= less than 
5 years 2= more than 5 years_____________________ 
2.2.8 Duration at which the scheme is functional per year:  1= seasonal, 2 = all year 
round _________ 
2.2.9 Total number of irrigation water users groups authorised to access water in the 
scheme _______________________ 
2.2.10  Name of authorized irrigation water users groups with water right permit, and 
year started/formed organisation: 1______________(year______), 
2______________(year____), 3________________(year______), 
4__________________(year________), 
2.2.11 Name of authorized irrigation water users groups without water right permit, 
and year started/formed organisation: 1______________(year______), 
2______________(year____), 3________________(year______), 
4__________________(year________), 
2.2.12 Total area served irrigation water by the scheme______________________ 
ha 
2.2.13 Total number of villages/ wards served by the scheme___________________ 
2.2.14 Average farm size holdings per farm household served by the 
scheme________acres 
2.2.15 Production organisation within the scheme: 1= individual, 0= group 
_____________ 
2.1.16 irrigation method used 1= surface flooding with pump house, 0 =otherwise 
(specify) 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
2.2.17 Number of farmer participants trend in different groups over the past 10 years 
within the scheme 
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s/n Group name  Year Number of   irrigation farmer 
participants in the group  
1  
 
 
 
2003  
2004  
.  
.  
2013  
2  2003  
.  
.  
2013  
3  2003  
.  
.  
2013  
 
2.2.18 Conditions for property rights (water rights permit) ownership status: 1= 
member of water users’ group, 2= individuals not members who can pay fee, 3 = 
anybody not necessarily member of water users’ group provided belongs to the 
community, 4= others (specify)________________________ 
2.2.19 What other terms of contracts are specified in the water rights permit granted 
for both parties (i.e, granter and grantee of the water rights) 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
______________ 
 
2.2.18 What is trend on Contract agreement compliance related to operation and 
maintenance of infrastructure and other fee payments/contributions as specified in 
the water rights permit granted to different irrigation groups/users in the scheme  
 
Group 
name  
year Season 
1= 
rainy 
2= dry 
Total 
number of 
members 
per group 
Number 
of 
members 
complied 
on OM 
Number of 
members 
complied on 
other 
fee/contributions 
Percent  
compliance 
  
2003 
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.      
 
. 
 
     
     
 
 
 
2013 
     
     
 
 
2.2.19 What is trend on contact, coordination, and information sharing related to 
water distribution, management and control for water users in different irrigation 
groups within the scheme 
Group 
name  
Year Presen
ce of 
water 
distrib
ution 
calend
ar: 1= 
yes, 2= 
No 
mechanis
ms for 
regulating 
water 
allocation 
at 
individual 
farm 
outlets  
1= formal 
guard, 2= 
self 
enforcing 
Informa
tion 
sharing 
mode: 
1= 
meeting
s, 2= 
others 
Number 
of 
meetings 
related to 
irrigation 
affairs  
per year 
Average 
number 
of 
particip
ants’ 
attendan
ce per 
year 
Average 
number of 
frequency 
of 
irrigation 
extension 
technical 
services 
support 
provided 
 2003       
.       
.       
.       
2013       
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2.2.20 Indicate the trend on control mechanisms implemented over time to enforce 
property rights, and compliances on water accessibility, and management for water 
users in different irrigation groups within the scheme 
 Group 
name 
Year Presence of 
security 
guard  for 
monitoring 
violations at 
the scheme: 
1= yes, 2= no 
Monitoring costs 
contributed (both 
monetary(Tzs) and 
time/effort hour) 
Tzs                   
hours 
Number of penalties/fine 
implemented through 
formal & informal means: 
 
formal                         
informal 
 
 
 
2003      
.      
.      
.      
.      
.      
2013      
 
2.3 Irrigation outputs (rice) market characteristics as a proxy of resource importance 
for users’ livelihood  
Group 
name 
Year Average 
Quantity 
produced (total) 
Average 
Quantity 
sold (total) 
Distance to 
the market 
Output 
market 
price per 
unit 
(bag/kg) 
 2003     
.     
.     
.     
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.     
.     
.     
.     
2013     
 
 
 
Thanks for your cooperation 
 
